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LOGIC WITHOUT EXPERIENCE: THE PROBLEM
OF FEDERAL APPELLATE COURTS
Suzanna Sherry*
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.
-Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (1881)1
INTRODUCTION
Behold the lucky federal district court judge. Conventional wis-
dom holds that her job is becoming easier and more gratifying as the
Supreme Court cuts back on federal jurisdiction and thus on the
scope of her authority, and both the Court and amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure expand her discretion to exercise the
remaining authority. Meanwhile, political scientists tease her with the
promise of promotion, suggesting that the number of district court
judges elevated to federal courts of appeals is high and getting higher.
On all three fronts-jurisdiction, discretion, and promotion-many
scholars lament the trends.
This Article argues that the conventional wisdom is wrong, but
that this fact is not cause for scholarly celebration. The Supreme
Court (with help from the courts of appeals) has actually begun to
expand federal jurisdiction and contract judicial discretion, although
© 2006 Suzanna Sherry. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format, at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre
Dame Law Review, and includes this provision and copyright notice.
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few have noticed. The new jurisdictional 
trend is worrisome because
the Court has not acknowledged-much 
less explained-its change of
direction. As a result, the new rules 
are often unclear and inconsis-
tent with existing precedent, leaving 
lower courts with little guidance
in applying the changing doctrines 
and litigants with incentives to
fight over jurisdiction instead of over 
the merits. At the same time,
the diminished discretion imposes 
its own costs on litigation in the
federal courts. Reduced discretion 
affects docket management to the
extent that it limits or eliminates 
procedural devices that can resolve
cases efficiently; it reduces courts' ability 
to police the behavior of law-
yers and litigants, increasing incentives 
for misbehavior; and it is detri-
mental to the relationship between state 
and federal judicial systems,
both because it moves primary responsibility 
for managing judicial
federalism from district courts to appellate 
courts and because it often
replaces contextual decisionmaking 
with rigid rules.
Looking at all of these consequences 
together, it becomes clear
that the federal court system is not functioning 
as it should. District
courts are likely to confront more cases 
and more issues unrelated to
the merits of each case, and have less 
flexibility in resolving cases accu-
rately and efficiently. Moreover, the 
simultaneous trends have pro-
duced an internally inconsistent and 
inexplicable regime in which the
combination of fuzzy rules on jurisdictional 
questions and clear rules
limiting trial court discretion on other 
issues misallocates judicial re-
sources between trial and appellate 
courts.
Why would appellate courts create such 
an untenable situation? I
contend that the culprit is inexperience. 
The majority of judges forg-
ing these rules and fueling these trends, 
whether on the courts of ap-
peals or the Supreme Court, are not 
familiar with the realities of the
litigation process. Thus there are 
not, as some scholars argue, too
many former district court judges on the 
federal appellate bench,
there are too few. Without sufficient 
hands-on experience at the trial
level, appellate judges-on both the 
Supreme Court and the courts of
appeals-have little or no understanding 
of how their decisions play
out on the ground. Scholars have missed 
this problem because they
typically worry that the promotion of 
district judges will create a
professionalized (and thus overly bureaucratic) 
cadre of judges or en-
courage district judges to render decisions 
that increase their likeli-
hood of elevation. But far more worrisome 
are the negative effects on
the litigation process of having too few 
appellate judges with trial
court experience. If we want to temper 
the two doctrinal trends and
mitigate their deleterious consequences, 
as well as prevent further de-
terioration in the functioning of district 
courts, we ought to promote
increased appellate exposure to district 
court perspectives. Only by
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increasing the number of former district judges on the appellate
bench might we see relief from the problems that currently plague
litigation.
This Article proceeds in four steps. Part I catalogs the doctrinal
changes that have expanded federal jurisdiction, and Part II shows
how the general trend toward expanded discretion masks the dimin-
ishing discretion in particular procedural contexts. I examine the
negative consequences of these changes in Part II1. Finally, Part IV
looks at causes and cures, including prospects for the future based on
current trends in judicial appointments.
I. TtiE FRuITs OF INEXPERIENCE: EXPANDING JURISDICTION
For about three decades beginning in the early 1970s, Supreme
Court decisions tended to restrict the scope of federal jurisdiction.
Perhaps in response to perceived excesses of the Warren Court, the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts created, expanded, or reinvigorated
doctrines that limited access to federal courts, especially for civil rights
plaintiffs. 2 Teachers of federal jurisdiction courses began describing
their classes as lessons in how to be shut out of federal court. Then, in
a sudden burst of enthusiasm around the turn of the century, the
Court unexpectedly held in favor of federal-court jurisdiction in a
host of cases.3 Since the recent expansion of jurisdiction cannot be
adequately assessed outside the historical context, I begin with the era
that saw the constriction of federal-court jurisdiction and then turn to
the more recent change in direction.
In documenting the ebb and flow of federal jurisdiction, I do not
mean to express any view about the legal soundness or wisdom of ei-
ther trend. I describe the earlier, restrictive doctrines and their col-
lective jurisdictional consequences merely to contrast them to the
more recent change in direction. In particular, I do not suggest that
the recent trend is incorrect, only that it is insufficiently transparent
or explained.4 It is also heedless of the consequences for lower fed-
2 See infra Part I.A.
3 See infra Part I.B.
4 Were the Court to forthrightly overrule some of its earlier cases, justifying its
action as a necessary corrective to overly strict limits on federal jurisdiction (especially
for civil rights claimants), it might well be correct. But the expansion of jurisdiction
appears thoughtless and unjustified (even if justifiable). Some commentators ap-
plaud the loosening of particular restrictions on jurisdiction, but only in a single doc-
trinal context and usually without considering either the adequacy of the Court's
analysis or the effect on district courts. See Robert V. Percival & Joanna B. Goger,
Escaping the Common Law's Shadow: Standing in the Light of Laidlaw, 12 DuKE ENVTL. L.
& POL'Y F. 119, 141-44 (2001) (praising recent standing case); Robert C. Post, The
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eral courts. Combined with the contraction of discretion identified in
Part II, this trend leaves federal district judges with a variety of
problems that I explore in Part III.
A. Closing the Federal Courts
The Burger Court wasted no time before cutting back on access
to the federal courts for plaintiffs alleging violations of constitutional
rights. In 1971, in Younger v. Harris,5 the Court manufactured "Our
Federalism" as a barrier to suits seeking to prevent patently unconsti-
tutional state criminal prosecutions.
Harris was indicted in California for distributing political leaf-
lets, 6 and charged with violating the same statute that the Supreme
Court had upheld some forty years earlier in Whitney v. California.
7
Whitney was expressly overruled in Brandenburg v. Ohio,8 and thus the
unconstitutionality of Harris's prosecution was quite clear. Harris
(along with several others who were found to lack standing) brought
suit in federal court under § 1983, asking the court to enjoin the
county district attorney from prosecuting him.9
Under existing doctrine, Harris was entitled to his injunction.
The Court's reversal of Whitney left no doubt about the statute's un-
constitutionality, and federal statutes clearly authorized both the exer-
cise of jurisdiction and the issuance of the injunction. Section 1983
was enacted-as the Court explicitly recognized a year later-in part
to prevent violation of federal constitutional rights by state prosecu-
Supreme Court, 2002 Term-Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts,
and Law, 117 HARv. L. REv. 4, 21-41 (2003) (praising recent sovereign immunity
case); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Edward L. Baskauskas, "Inextricably Intertwined"Explicable
at Last? Rooker-Feldman Analysis After the Supreme Court's Exxon Mobil Decision, FED.
CTS. L. REV., at 11-25 (May 2006), http://www.fclr.org/docs/2006fedctstrevl.pdf
(praising recent case narrowing Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Kristen M. Shults, Com-
ment, Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for
Environmentalists, Its Implications on Future Justiciability Decisions, and Resolution of Issues
on Remand, 89 GEo. L.J. 1001, 1011-18 (2001) (praising recent standing case); Adam
P.M. Tarleton, Note, In Search of the Welcome Mat: The Scope of Statutory Federal Question
Jurisdiction After Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineeing & Manufac-
turing, 84 N.C. L. REV. 1394, 1407-08 (2006) (praising recent federal question case);
Paul A. Avron, The Little Doctrine that (Almost) Could: The Supreme Court Clarifies the Nar-
row Scope of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine, FED. LAw.,Jan. 2006, at 22, 23 (2006) (prais-
ing recent case narrowing Rooker-Feldman doctrine).
5 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
6 Id. at 38-40.
7 274 U.S. 357, 359, 380 (1927).
8 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969).




tors and judges.'0 For that reason, § 1983 is an expressly authorized
exception to the federal Anti-Injunction Act, which otherwise bars fed-
eral courts from enjoining state-court proceedings."I Moreover, fed-
eral courts had been enjoining state criminal proceedings for much of
the previous eighty years. 12 The three-judge district court accordingly
issued the requested injunction.'
The Supreme Court reversed in a notoriously opaque opinion. 14
Invoking both equity doctrines and principles of federalism, the Court
held that federal courts could not issue injunctions against ongoing
state criminal proceedings. 15 Commentators have criticized virtually
every aspect of the decision. 16 Nevertheless, over the next sixteen
years, the Court extended Younger's limitations to cases seeking de-
claratory judgments,17 state administrative proceedings,"' state pro-
10 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972).
11 Id. at 228-29, 243.
12 See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Cases
Dombrowski Forgot, 46 U. CHm. L. REv. 636, 641-59 (1979); Aviam Soifer & H.C. Mac-
gill, The Younger Doctrine: Reconstructing Reconstruction, 55 TEx. L. REv. 1141, 1148-63
(1977); Burton D. Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment,
49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 740, 743, 765-66 (1974).
13 Harris, 281 F. Supp. at 516-17.
14 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
15 Id. at 40-41.
16 The Court ignored both the historical purposes of § 1983 and the fact that
equitable barriers were not thought to apply across different jurisdictions at the time
of its enactment, and thus that its drafters almost certainly contemplated that it could
be used by federal courts to enjoin unconstitutional state criminal prosecutions. See,
e.g., Douglas Laycock, Federal Interference with State Prosecutions: The Need for Prospective
Relief 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 193, 232-34; Gene R. Nichol,Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and
Section 1983, 73 VA. L. REv. 959, 971-1000 (1987); Ralph U. Whitten, Federal Declara-
tory and Injunctive Interference with State Court Proceedings: The Supreme Court and the Lim-
its of Judicial Discretion, 53 N.C. L. REv. 591, 649-83 (1975); Donald H. Zeigler, A
Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light of the Legislative History of Reconstruction,
1983 DuKE L.J. 987, 997. Justice Black's majority opinion also incorrectly attributes
the phrase "Our Federalism" to "the early struggling days of our Union of States,"
Younger, 401 U.S. at 44-45, when in fact it had first been used by Justice Frankfurter in
1939, and had appeared in the United States Reports only sporadically since. See
Michael G. Collins, Whose Federalism?, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 75, 75-78 (1992). For
other criticism of Younger, see, for example, LARRY W. YACKLE, RECLAIMING THE FED-
EPAL COURTS 128-31 (1994); George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of Pow-
ers Collide-RethinkingYounger Abstention, 59 Gro. WASh. L. REV. 114, 119-25 (1990);
Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of Abstention, 88 MIct. L. REV. 530, 534-46 (1989);
Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function,
94 YALE L.J. 71, 84-95 (1984); Martin H. Redish, The Doctrine of Younger v. Harris:
Deference in Search of a Rationale, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 463, 477-87 (1978); William H.
Theis, Younger v. Harris: Federalism in Context, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 103, 155-72 (1981).
17 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 473-75 (1974).
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ceedings initiated in response to the request for federal injunctive relief
(and thus that were not ongoing at the time of the request),19 and
state civil lawsuits. 20 The expanded doctrine thus channeled many
constitutional challenges to state statutes into state courts.
Younger was the earliest example-and perhaps the one most
lacking in constitutional, statutory, historical, or precedential basis-
of the three-decade-long trend of restricting access to federal courts,
but it is far from the only example. After Younger, the Court sequen-
tially began to expand or develop other doctrines that narrowed fed-
eral jurisdiction, especially for plaintiffs complaining that their federal
rights had been violated. 2'
Between 1975 and 1992, the Court imposed increasingly high
barriers to standing. To ensure that the federal courts decide only
actual cases and controversies, the Supreme Court has always required
that plaintiffs have standing: that is, that they show an actual harm to
themselves that the lawsuit seeks to remedy. 22 Beyond this constitu-
tional minimum, however, the standing doctrine has ebbed and
flowed over time. After liberally granting standing in such cases as
Flast v. Cohen23 and United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures (SCRAP),24 the Court backtracked for almost twenty
years. Beginning with Warth v. Seldin25 in 1975, the Court began a
pattern of reading complaints narrowly, 26 requiring plaintiffs to estab-
lish their cases on the merits in order to obtain standing 27 and gradu-
ally reading into the Constitution what had originally been judicially-
18 Ohio Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton Christian Schs., Inc., 477 U.S. 619,
626-29 (1986); Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S.
423, 436-37 (1982).
19 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 342 n.11 (1975).
20 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1987).
21 I leave to one side the doctrines governing the habeas corpus jurisdiction of
the federal courts. While these doctrines have also followed the trends identified in
text-it became harder to have a claim heard on the merits during the last third of
the twentieth century, followed by some easing of restrictions since 2000-statutory
changes complicate the picture and make it beyond the scope of this Article.
22 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
23 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968).
24 412 U.S. 669, 688-90 (1973).
25 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
26 Id. at 517-18 (holding that there was no standing because construction plain-
tiffs (sellers) had failed to show the availability of willing buyers, and low-income
plaintiffs (buyers) failed to show the availability of willing sellers).
27 See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 758 (1984).
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created "prudential" limits subject to elimination by Congress.28 By
1990, the Court commented that the generous notion of standing in
the 1973 SCRAP case had "never since been emulated by this Court."2 9
Plaintiffs-especially public interest plaintiffs challenging governmen-
tal actions with broad impact, such as environmental regulations--
faced almost insurmountable hurdles before they could obtain judi-
cial consideration of their claims on the merits.
Together, Younger and standing barriers kept many constitutional
challenges out of federal court, but not all. In particular, plaintiffs
who sought compensation for concrete constitutional injuries-illegal
searches, discriminatory treatment, denials of due process--that state
courts (or state administrative agencies) had failed to remedy faced
no hurdles under either Younger or standing doctrines. Because the
state proceedings had ended, Younger did not counsel restraint; be-
cause the harms were clear, concrete, and individualized, plaintiffs sat-
isfied even the most stringent requirements of standing.
Enter 28 U.S.C. § 1738, the Full Faith and Credit Act. Originally
enacted in 1790, it provides that judgments in the states (and territo-
ries) "shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the
United States ... as they have" in the state (or territory) which issued
them.30 Before 1980, however, "federal courts frequently disre-
gard[ed] this statutory mandate, and instead ... decide[d] cases with
regard to a general federal law of resjudicata."31 The Supreme Court
itself often determined the preclusive effect of a prior state-court judg-
ment by looking to general federal law rather than to the law of the
state issuing the judgment, without even mentioning § 1738.32 Lower
28 See, e.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992); Gollust v.
Mendell, 501 U.S. 115, 125-26 (1991); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 37-42 (1976).
29 Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 889 (1990).
30 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000). For the original language, see Act of May 26, 1790,
ch. 11, 1 Stat. 122.
31 Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rv. 1133, 1334
(1977); accord Barbara Ann Atwood, State Court Judgments in Federal Litigation: Mapping
the Contours of Full Faith and Credit, 58 IND. L.J. 59, 59 (1982) (" [T]he statute fre-
quently has been overlooked or disregarded by the federal courts.").
32 See, e.g., Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 138-39 (1979); Montana v. United
States, 440 U.S. 147, 162-64 (1979); Union & Planters' Bank v. City of Memphis, 189
U.S. 71, 75 (1903); see also Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 109 (1963). In Durfee, the
Court was faced with determining the preclusive effect of a prior state-court judgment
on a case originally brought in a second state's court but removed to federal court.
Id. at 107-09. Although the Court relied on § 1738, it did so entirely in the context of
the statutory requirement that the courts of each state give full faith and credit to the
judgments of other states. ld. at 107 ("The case before us presents questions arising
under" the Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause, which is applicable to state
20061
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
federal courts followed suit. Sometimes they ignored § 1738 entirely,
sometimes they suggested that the contours of preclusion were up to
the federal court to define, and sometimes they noted explicitly that
other federal policies-including those embodied in civil rights stat-
utes-could overcome the dictates of § 1738. 3" The 1973 edition (not
revised until 1988) of Hart & Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Fed-
eral System, the most exhaustively comprehensive federal courts
casebook, contains a single short paragraph on § 1738's directive to
federal courts, simply noting without case citation or discussion that
§ 1738 protects prior state-court judgments "[n]ot only in other state
courts but also 'in every court within the United States and its Territo-
ries and Possessions.' "5 4
courts only); id. at 109 ("Full faith and credit thus generally requires every State to
give to a judgment at least the res judicata effect which the judgment would be ac-
corded in the State which rendered it."); id. at 110 (discussing exceptions to the doc-
trine that "a judgment of a court in one State is conclusive upon the merits in a court
in another State").
33 See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Notwithstand-
ing the existence of § 1738 ... there are a number of cases in this circuit which have
analyzed the issue of the extent to which the prior state courtjudgment precludes the
subsequent Federal Civil Rights Act lawsuit and make no references whatever to
§ 1738 or to the concepts of resjudicata and collateral estoppel which would be em-
ployed by the courts of the state in which the prior judgment was rendered."); Red
Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 365 n.3 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[Tjhe implementation of
federal statutes representing countervailing and compelling federal policies justifies
departures from a strict application of [§ 1738]."); Batiste v. Furnco Constr. Corp.,
503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that "'other well-defined federal poli-
cies . .. may compete with those policies underlying section 1738"' (quoting Am.
Mannex Corp. v. Rozands, 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir. 1972))); Am. Mannex Corp., 462
F.2d at 690 ("[Section 1738] does not necessarily mean, however, that a federal court
is invariably bound to a state's own interpretation of res judicata or judicial estop-
pel."); Midgett v. United States, 603 F.2d 835, 845 (Ct. Cl. 1979) (state preclusion
rules must yield to "important and established federal policy"); Williams v. Sclafani,
444 F. Supp. 906, 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), affd, 580 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting that
"relaxed principles of res judicata" apply in civil rights suits); Schwegmann Bros. Gi-
ant Super Mkts. v. La. Milk Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144, 1147 (M.D. La. 1973)
("While the federal court hearing the second case will give great consideration to the
State's interpretation of its doctrines of res judicata and judicial estoppel, it is not
necessarily bound by those interpretations."); see also Atwood, supra note 31, at 71-72
& nn. 63-65 (collecting cases that show the inconsistency of Supreme Court prece-
dent and the lower courts' failure to develop coherent law on the preclusive effects of
state-court judgments). See generally William H. Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act
Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 Nw. U. L. REv. 859 (1976) (arguing that civil
rights claims should usually not be barred by res judicata).
34 PAUL M. BATOR, PAUL]. MISHKIN, DAVID L. SHAPIRO, & HERBERT WECHSLER,
HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 842 (2d ed. 1973)
(quoting § 1738). The 1983 first edition of another casebook, written shortly after
[VOL. 82:1
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As the law stood in 1980, then, the Full Faith and Credit Act was
moribund, especially in civil rights cases. Within a few years, however,
the Supreme Court had resurrected the statute as a formidable barrier
for civil rights plaintiffs seeking to litigate federal claims in federal
court. The Court first held both that § 1738 applied even in civil
rights cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and that it barred the
relitigation of issues previously litigated in state court (usually called
issue preclusion).35 Four years later, it extended the doctrine to pre-
clude federal litigation of claims that might have been, but were not,
litigated in the earlier state-court proceeding (usually called claim
preclusion).3 6 By 1986 the Court had applied § 1738 to bar claims
that could not have been raised in the earlier state-court suit because
they were within exclusive federal jurisdiction,' 7 extended federal
common law res judicata doctrine to preclude relitigation of issues
decided in some state administrative proceedings, 38 and held that Ti-
tle VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-the federal employment discrimi-
nation statute-did not create an exception to § 1738.39 Especially
for plaintiffs with both state and federal claims, these doctrines con-
verted forum selection into a decision fraught with potentially disposi-
tive consequences. And for defendants in criminal cases or quasi-
criminal administrative or judicial proceedings, the doctrines served
to eliminate their ability to seek federal review of their federal claims
except through the tortuous (and increasingly difficult) method of
obtaining a writ of habeas corpus.
Civil rights plaintiffs were not the only parties excluded from fed-
eral court during this period. In two tort cases decided three years
apart, the Court narrowed the scope of both federal question jurisdic-
tion and pendent jurisdiction. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, federal courts
the Supreme Court began the resurrection of § 1738 in Allen v. McCuriy, 449 U.S. 90
(1980), contains only a one-page note on McCuny (in the chapter on Younger v. Har-
ris, 401 US. 37 (1971)), which suggests that even in the early 1980s federal courts
scholars did not view § 1738 as an important doctrine. See MARTIN H. RErIsH, FED-
ERAL COURTS 712-13 (1st ed. 1983).
35 Allen, 449 U.S. at 103-05.
36 Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 81-85 (1984).
37 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 373-79 (1996); Mar-
rese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 379-87 (1985).
38 Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 796-99 (1986).
39 Kremer v. Chem. Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468-83 (1982); see also Matsu-
shita, 516 U.S. at 380-86 (finding no exception to § 1738 under section 27 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Parsons Steel, Inc., v. First Ala. Bank, 474 U.S. 518,
523-26 (1986) (finding no exception to § 1738 under Anti-Injunction Act relitigation
exception).
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have jurisdiction over cases "arising under" federal law.40 The exact
contours of this grant of jurisdiction have bedeviled courts for more
than a hundred years, especially in the context of what Justice Frank-
furter called the "litigation-provoking problem": a federal question
embedded in a state cause of action. 4 1 The seminal case of Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust C0.42 allowed jurisdiction in just such a situa-
tion, holding that jurisdiction exists whenever "the right to relief de-
pends upon the construction or application of the Constitution or
laws of the United States."43 But in 1986, in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti-
cals, Inc. v. Thompson,44 the Court backed away from Smith, holding
that
a complaint alleging a violation of a federal statute as an element of
a state cause of action, when Congress has determined that there
should be no private, federal cause of action for the violation, does
not state a claim 'arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of
the United States.'
45
The Court engaged in a similar analysis of congressional intent in
Finley v. United States.46 Finley addressed the reach of pendent-party
jurisdiction, the doctrine governing whether a plaintiff may join addi-
tional defendants when the claims against those defendants lack inde-
pendent subject matter jurisdiction but arise from the same
transaction or occurrence as the claims giving rise to the primary law-
suit.47 Prior to Finley, the Court had adopted a rule allowing pendent-
party jurisdiction in federal courts unless "Congress in the statutes
conferring jurisdiction ... expressly or by implication negated its exis-
tence." 48 In Finley, the Court reversed the presumption, requiring "an
affirmative grant of pendent-party jurisdiction" by Congress. 49 In so
40 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2000).
41 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 470 (1957)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
42 255 U.S. 180 (1920).
43 Id. at 199.
44 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
45 Id. at 817 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (a)). As the dissent in Merrell Dow pointed
out, a congressional intent against creating a private cause of action-essentially a
decision to relegate statutory claims to federal agencies in the first instance-is not
the same as a congressional preference for state courts over federal courts; indeed, to
the extent that Congress chose agencies for reasons of uniformity and expertise, its
decision suggests a congressional view that if any court is to adjudicate statutory
claims, it should be a federal court. Id. at 831-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
46 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
47 Id. at 549.
48 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 (1976).
49 Finley, 490 U.S. at 553.
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holding, the majority eviscerated the doctrine 
of pendent-party juris-
diction, since if Congress affirmatively 
grants jurisdiction there is no
need for a doctrine whose sole purpose 
is to determine whether there
is jurisdiction over additional 
parties not within the statutory 
grant.50
Congress quickly responded to Finley's 
contraction of jurisdiction by
authorizing pendent-party jurisdiction 
a year later.5
1 Nevertheless,
Finley, like Merrell Dow, is an example of 
the Court's sharp contraction
of federal-court jurisdiction during the 
last decades of the twentieth
century.
In 1996, the Court embarked on its most 
controversial doctrinal
innovation limiting federal jurisdiction. 
The Eleventh Amendment to
the Constitution provides that "[tlhe Judicial 
power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend 
to any suit in law or equity,
commenced or prosecuted against one 
of the United States by Citi-
zens of another State, or by Citizens 
or Subjects of any Foreign
State."5 2 Early interpretations extended 
states' sovereign immunity to
suits in admiralty
53 and suits brought by their own citizens,
5 4 neither
of which are within the language of the 
Amendment. A careful exami-
nation of both these precedents and the 
historical circumstances sur-
rounding the adoption of Article III 
and the Eleventh Amendment
indicates that the extension of immunity 
beyond the language of the
Amendment rested primarily on the Court's 
conclusion that the Con-
stitution was not intended to erase whatever 
common law immunity
states enjoyed prior to its 
ratification.
55
50 See id. at 556-57 (Blackmun,J., 
dissenting). Moreover, since the 
Court did not
persuasively distinguish pendent-party 
from pendent-claim jurisdiction 
as a matter of
constitutional or statutory interpretation 
(but simply as pragmatically different), 
Fin-
ley put in jeopardy even the twenty-year-old 
liberalization of pendent-claim jurisdic-
tion. See Thomas M. Mengler, 
The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary 
Jurisdiction, 1990
BYU L. REv. 247, 260 ("Notwithstanding 
Justice Scalia's unwillingness to 
limit or im-
pair pendent claim and ancillary 
jurisdiction, Finey's premises create 
a wedge for
chipping away at those doctrines."); 
Wendy Collins Perdue, Finley v. 
United States:
Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 
VA. L. REv. 539, 567-68 (1990) ("By 
characterizing
Gibbs as inconsistent with the requirement 
of statutory authorization of jurisdiction,
the Court has in essence declared 
pendent-claim jurisdiction to be 
an unconstitu-
tional usurpation of power.").
51 Judicial Improvements Act 
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5089 (codi-
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2000)); 
see infra notes 103-05 and accompanying 
text.
52 U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
53 Ex parte NewYork, 256 U.S. 
490 (1921).
54 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
55 For an overview of this history, 
see Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 
44, 78-92
(1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 
101-23 (Souter, J., dissenting). For 
a list of
some of the voluminous scholarship 
supporting this interpretation, see 
id. at 110 n.8
(Souter, J., dissenting).
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If states' immunity from suit was derived from common law
rather than from the text of the Constitution or its amendments, how-
ever, we would expect that Congress, acting under any of its constitu-
tionally authorized powers, could abrogate that immunity just as it
could change any other common law doctrine. And indeed, until
1996, that assumption held. One 1989 decision by a badly fractured
Court explicitly upheld a congressional abrogation of immunity.56
More telling is the Court's adherence to what it termed the "clear
statement rule": that Congress must clearly state its intent to abrogate
state immunity.57 The clear statement rule determines whether Con-
gress has abrogated state immunity, and thus necessarily depends on a
prior determination that Congress may abrogate that immunity.
Despite this historical and precedential support for a congres-
sional power of abrogation, in the 1996 case of Seminole Tribe v. Flor-
ida56 the Court overruled its prior precedent and held that Congress
could subject states to suit only when it acted under the powers given
to it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.59 "The Eleventh
Amendment," the Court held, "restricts the judicial power under Arti-
cle III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. '" 60 In so holding, the
Court effectively constitutionalized what had previously been thought
to be a common law barrier to suits against the plaintiffs own state. 61
Over the next five years, the Court used the Seminole Tribe analysis to
invalidate five different federal statutes that purported to abrogate
state sovereign immunity.
62
This trend of restricting jurisdiction is not news. It has been am-
ply identified, explored, and criticized in the literature (although
each doctrine is usually treated individually, rather than amalgamated
56 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 13-23 (1989).
57 See, e.g., Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 232 (1989); Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241, 255 n.7 (1985).
58 517 U.S. 44.
59 Id. at 59-66.
60 Id. at 72.
61 For an explanation and critique of this process of "constitutionalization," see
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 760-95 (1999) (Souter, J., dissenting).
62 See BRd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364 (2001) (Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78-91 (2000)
(Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden, 527 U.S. at 712-14 (Fair Labor Stan-
dards Act); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 670-72 (1999) (Lanham Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ednc. Expense Bd. v.




as I have done).63 Indeed, many scholars are still focusing on the con-
traction ofjurisdiction. 64 But these critiques now miss the mark: What
has not been previously noted is the extent to which the last six years
or so have seen a reversal in direction, Peginning with a trickle of
cases in the late 1990s and exploding in three unrelated cases in the
single 2004 Term, the Court has directly or indirectly undermined the
doctrines that had narrowed federal jurisdiction. I turn to this new
expansion of jurisdiction in the next subpart.
B. Expanding Federal Jurisdiction
The recent jurisdictional changes have taken several forms. In
the context of standing, it is a somewhat amorphous shift in emphasis
and results suggesting a more generous view of standing without any
change in doctrine. The change is even more subtle for Younger and
the preclusion doctrines, as the Court has cut back not on those doc-
trines but on a related doctrine that serves a similar purpose and had
been used by lower courts to fill in the gaps between Younger and pre-
clusion. For state sovereign immunity, however, the reversal is stun-
ning, with the Court upholding three federal abrogations that are
63 In addition to the sources cited supra notes 12 & 16 (criticizing Younger), and
50 (criticizing Finley), see, for example, Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with
Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After Merrell Dow, 52 Oyio ST. L.J. 1477, 1493-94
(1991); Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evis-
ceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REv. 495, 503-10 (1997); Daniel j. Meltzer,
The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign Immunity, 1996 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 20-24;
Marjorie A. Silver, In Lieu of Preclusion: Reconciling Administrative Decisionmaking and
Federal Civil Rights Claims, 65 IND. L.J. 367, 379-94 (1990).
64 See, e.g., Michelle Adams, Causation, Constitutional Principles, and the Jurispruden-
tial Legacy of the Warren Court, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1173, 1185-1202 (2002); Marsha
S. Berzon, Rights and Remedies, 64 LA. L. REv. 519, 538-39 (2004); E. Martin Estrada,
Pushing Doctrinal Limits: The Trend Toward Applying Younger Abstention to Claims for
Monetary Damages and RaisingYounger Abstention Sua Sponte on Appeal, 81 N.D. L, REv.
475, 489-96 (2005); Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601,
1660-64 (2002); RobertJ. Kaczorowski, Congress's Power to Enforce Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: Lessons from Federal Remedies the Framers Enacted, 42 HARIV. J. ON LEGIs. 187,
282-83 (2005); John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise
Constitutional Texts, 113 YALE LJ. 1663, 1728-33 (2004); Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The
Particularly Dubious Case of Hans v. Louisiana: An Essay on Law, Race, History, and "Fed-
eral Courts, "81 N.C. L. REv. 1927, 1954-75 (2003); RobertJ. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the
Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme Court's Theory that Self-
Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MAv L. REv. 1289, 1291-1312 (2005); David
Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding Rights and Restricted Remedies,
2005 U. ILL. L. REv. 1199, 1225-34; Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:
Hostility to Litigation as an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court's Jurisprudence, 84
TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1117-52 (2006).
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indistinguishable from those so recently invalidated. Similarly, the
Court has substantially revised the Merrell Dow rule (although without
admitting it has done so) and potentially opened the federal courts to
a host of nondiversity-based state-law claims. And after construing
pendentjurisdiction narrowly in Finley, it recently interpreted the new
supplemental jurisdiction statute-enacted in response to Finley-
much more broadly than its drafters intended. This subpart begins
with the most obvious changes and then discusses the more subtle
shifts.
1. State Sovereign Immunity
Seminole Tribe and its progeny rested on two independent doctri-
nal bases, both of which have now been undermined. First, in Semi-
nole Tribe itself, the Court held that Congress can only abrogate state
sovereign immunity when it uses the power granted by Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, not when it acts under its Article I pow-
ers.6 5 Subsequent cases then turned on the Court's narrow interpreta-
tion of Congress's Section 5 powers. When acting pursuant to Section
5, the Court held, Congress can outlaw behavior beyond that actually
prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment itself only if the legislation
is a "congruent and proportional" response to a "widespread pattern"
of unconstitutional action by the states.
66
Between 1996 and 2001, the Court applied these requirements
quite strictly. Because Congress had not documented a pattern of un-
constitutional discrimination by the states against the aged or the dis-
abled, neither the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
nor the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was held to be a valid
exercise of Section 5 powers.67 A history of state actions with a dispa-
rate impact on either group was insufficient, because only intentional
(and, in the context of age and disability, irrational) discrimination
65 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
66 See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 365 ("congruence and proportionality"); id. at 368 ("his-
tory and pattern"); id. at 372 ("congruence and proportionality"); id. at 373 ("serious
pattern" and "marked pattern"); id. at 374 ("congruent and proportional"); Kimel,
528 U.S. at 81 ("congruence and proportionality"); id, at 90 ("widespread pattern");
id. at 91 ("widespread and unconstitutional ... discrimination"); Ha. Prepaid, 527 U.S.
at 639 ("congruence and proportionality"); id. at 645 ("widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights"); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520
(1997) ("congruence and proportionality"); id. at 526 ("widespread and persisting
deprivation of constitutional rights"); id. at 531 ("widespread pattern").
67 Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374 (holding abrogation of state sovereign immunity in the
ADA unconstitutional); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 87-92 (holding abrogation of state sover-
eign immunity in the ADEA unconstitutional).
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violates the Constitution. Similarly, the absence of any pattern of un-
constitutional state infringement of intellectual property-that is, in-
fringement without the possibility of compensation-led the Court to
invalidate two different congressional statutes purporting to allow
states to be sued for trademark or patent infringement.6
In 2000 and 2001, eight federal courts of appeals applied this line
of precedent to determine whether Congress had validly abrogated
state sovereign immunity in the 1993 Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) ,69 which, among other things, requires employers to provide
unpaid leave for employees caring for an ill family member.70 Seven
of the eight easily found the abrogation unconstitutional because the
FMLA was not a valid exercise of Congress's Section 5 powers as de-
fined by the Supreme Court.71 These courts reasoned that since Con-
gress had found no evidence of unconstitutional action by states in
their allocation or denial of family-care leave, the FMLA was not a
congruent and proportional response to a widespread pattern of un-
constitutional state action.
72
By a six-to-three vote, the Supreme Court nevertheless upheld the
FMLA's abrogation in 2003, holding in Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs7" that Congress had validly enacted the FMLA as a
measure to combat gender discrimination.7 4  Unfortunately, that
holding is flatly inconsistent with the precedent. The Court relied on
evidence that gender-neutral state limitations on parenting leaves have a
disparate impact on women. Congress did not study the effect of lack
of family-care leaves, and the Court offered no support for its bald
declaration that neutral state laws on both types of leave "implicate
68 See Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 672 (1999) (holding that the Lanham Act does not abrogate state sovereign im-
munity); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 643-44 (1999) (holding the Patent and Plant
Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act unconstitutional).
69 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2611-54 (West 1999 & Supp. 2006). For a list of the eight deci-
sions, see infia note 71.
70 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(c) (2000).
71 Laro v. New Hampshire, 259 F.3d 1, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2001); Lizzi v. Alexander,
255 F.3d 128, 134-38 (4th Cir. 2001); Townsel v. Missouri, 233 F.3d 1094, 1096 (8th
Cir. 2000); Chittister v. Dep't of Cmty. & Econ. Dev., 226 F.3d 223, 226-29 (3d Cir.
2000); Kazmier v.Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 527-33 (5th Cir. 2000); Sims v. Univ. of
Cincinnati, 219 F.3d 559, 561-62 (6th Cir. 2000); Hale v. Mann, 219 F.3d 61, 67-69
(2d Cir. 2000). But see Hibbs v. Nev. Dep't of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844, 851-61 (9th
Cir. 2001), affd, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
72 See, e.g., Hale, 219 F.3d at 68-69.
73 538 U.S. 721.
74 Id. at 728-40.
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the same stereotypes."75 Moreover, even the evidence of "discrimina-
tion" in parental leaves (with the exception of three states with facially
discriminatory parental leave policies, which presumably could have
been challenged in court) amounted to no more than a finding that
"'the primary responsibility for family caretaking often falls on wo-
men, and such responsibility affects the working lives of women more
than it affects the working lives of men.' "76 In other words, Congress
had the same type of evidence in enacting the FMLA that it did in
enacting the ADA: that neutral state policies often have a disparate
impact on a disadvantaged group. But the Court has consistently held
that neutral statutes with a disparate impact on even the most pro-
tected groups do not violate the Constitution unless they are enacted
with an intent to discriminate. 77 Hibbs is difficult to reconcile with the
earlier cases.
78
One might have written off Hibbs as an aberration, had not the
Court upheld a similar abrogation the next year. Having previously
struck down the abrogation of immunity in Title I of the ADA (ban-
ning disability discrimination in employment) as beyond Congress's
Section 5 powers, 79 the Court in Tennessee v, Lane" upheld the abro-
gation in Title II of the ADA (banning disability discrimination in
public accommodations). Lane involved a wheelchair-bound plaintiff
who claimed that the state's failure to accommodate his disability de-
nied him access to state courts."' Relying on the same evidence of
discrimination that it found insufficient in the Title I case, the major-
ity held that Title II was a valid exercise of congressional power under
Section 5 insofar as it "implicat[ed] the accessibility of judicial ser-
vices."8 2 Again, however, there was no evidence of intentional dis-
75 Id. at 731 n.5.
76 Id. at 728 n.2 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 2601(a)(5) (2000)).
77 See Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279-81 (1979) (disparate
impact on women does not violate Constitution); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
238-48 (1976) (disparate impact on racial minorities does not violate Constitution);
cf Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136 (1976) (pregnancy discrimination does
not violate Title VII because it is not gender discrimination); Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484, 494-505 (1974) (distinction based on pregnancy does not violate the
Constitution).
78 For elaboration of the arguments in this paragraph, see Suzanna Sherry, The
Unmaking of a Precedent, 2003 Sup. CT. REX,. 231, 238-48.
79 See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 87-92 (2001).
80 541 U.S. 509, 530-34 (2004).
81 Id. at 513.
82 Id. at 531.
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crimination in the legislative record."" 
It is hard to see Hibbs and Lane
as anything other than a withdrawal from 
the narrow interpretation of
Section 5 taken in the earlier cases, and 
therefore as an expansion of
the federal courts' jurisdiction to hear 
claims against state defendants
alleged to have violated plaintiffs' federal 
statutory rights.
Even more recently, the Court has undermined 
the core Seminole
Tribe holding that Congress lacks power 
under Article I to abrogate
state sovereign immunity. In Seminole 
Tribe and its progeny, the Court
concluded that the states retained any 
immunity except that "surren-
der[ed] . . . in the plan of the convention," 
that is, altered by the
Constitution itself.
8 4 The Court held that the Commerce 
Clause of
Article I, Section 8 does not represent 
such a surrender, despite its
broad allocation of authority to Congress. 
Indeed, as noted earlier,
the Court stated that Congress could 
not use any of its Article I powers
to abrogate sovereign immunity.
8 5 Nevertheless, in Central Virginia
Community College v. Katz,
8 6 the Court held that states do not have 
im-
munity from bankruptcy proceedings,
7 which are derived from Con-
gress's Article I, Section 8 power to 
establish "uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcies."
881 The majority justified its conclusion 
that
the bankruptcy power, unlike the commerce 
power, constituted a sur-
render of state immunity primarily by 
an historical analysis suggesting
that the framers recognized the need 
for uniform bankruptcy laws
that did not vary from state to state 
or require debtors to engage in
multiple discharge proceedings.
8 9 As the dissent pointed out, how-
ever, this argument does not distinguish 
the commerce power, which
was also enacted largely for purposes 
of uniformity
9° nor does it
demonstrate that the framers intended 
to extinguish state immunity
83 As the dissent pointed out, "there 
[was] nothing in the legislative record 
or
statutory findings to indicate that 
disabled persons were systematically 
denied the
right to be present at criminal trials, 
denied the meaningful opportunity 
to be heard
in civil cases, unconstitutionally excluded 
from jury service, or denied the right 
to
attend criminal trials." Id. at 543 
(Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting).
84 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 
U.S. 44, 68 (1996) (quoting Monaco 
v. Missis-
sippi, 292 U.S. 313, 321-23 (1934)); 
id. at 70 n.1
3 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81
(Alexander Hamilton)); see also Alden 
v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) 
(finding
immunity retained "except as altered 
by the plan of the Convention or 
certain consti-
tutional Amendments").
85 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying 
text.
86 126 S. Ct. 990, 1004-05 (2006).
87 Id. at 994.
88 U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, cl. 4.
89 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1002-05.
90 Id. at 1008 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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from suit rather than simply grant to Congress the power to pass bank-
ruptcy laws governing private individuals.91
Katz went further than simply allowing Congress to use its bank-
ruptcy authority to abrogate state immunity. The federal bankruptcy
statutes contain no "clear statement" of an intent to abrogate, and, as
the Court noted in Seminole Tribe, "it has not been widely thought that
the federal ... bankruptcy ... statutes abrogated the States' sovereign
immunity."92 Thus, even aside from the constitutional question, the
Court ought to have upheld the state's immunity on statutory
grounds. But the Court did not consider the statutory question rele-
vant. It held instead that the Bankruptcy Clause itself abrogated state
immunity without any need for further congressional action. 93 In
other words, although Clause 3 of Article I, Section 8 (the Commerce
Clause) does not even grant Congress the power to subject states to
suit, Clause 4 of the same Section (the Bankruptcy Clause) abrogates
state sovereign immunity all by itself.
The depth of the inconsistency with existing precedent is difficult
to overstate. Besides the already-noted conflict with Seminole Tribe, the
Katz Court repeats the Court's initial mistake that the Eleventh
Amendment was enacted to correct. In Chisholm v. Georgia9 4 in 1793,
the Court held that the Artidle III grant of federal jurisdiction over
suits "between a State and Citizens of another State" eliminated the
states' prior immunity from suit.9 5 The Eleventh Amendment was
adopted specifically to overturn Chisholm,9 6 as its language confirms: It
says not that the judicial power does not extend to such suits, but that
the judicial power "shall not be construed to extend" to such suits.
97
The Amendment seems to be directed at the judiciary, warning judges
against interpreting the mere adoption of the Constitution as extin-
guishing the states' common law immunity. (Whether Congress, by
further action, could abrogate this common law immunity has already
been discussed.98 ) Yet interpreting the Constitution to erase state im-
munity is exactly what the Court did in Katz. In short, Katz, like Hibbs
and Lane, cannot be reconciled with the precedent, and unexpectedly
expands the availability of a federal forum in certain cases.
91 Id. at 1009.
92 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72 n.16 (1996).
93 Katz, 126 S. Ct. at 1005.
94 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
95 Id.
96 See, e.g.,JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 21 (1987).
97 US. CONsT. amend. XI (emphasis added).
98 See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
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2. Federal Question and Supplemental Jurisdiction
Despite its somewhat cavalier treatment of precedent and its con-
fusing rationale, Merrell Dow was praiseworthy in its unequivocal clar-
ity: no private cause of action, no jurisdiction. But in one of a trio of
blockbuster federal jurisdiction cases in 2005, the Court unanimously
recast Merrell Dow as a fuzzy balancing test. In Grable & Sons Metal
Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,99 the Court upheld
federal jurisdiction over a state-law claim that turned on a question of
federal tax law. It did so despite the fact that the tax provision at issue
did not create a private cause of action. 00 It held that Merrell Dow-
despite the "broad language" that "on its face supports"10' a more re-
strictive interpretation disallowing jurisdiction-stands for the pro-
position that a federal court has jurisdiction over a federal question
embedded in a state cause of action when "a state-law claim necessa-
rily raise [s] a stated federal issue, actually disputed and substantial,
which a federal forum may entertain without disturbing any congres-
sionally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibili-
ties."102 This revisionist history not only expands federal jurisdiction
in ways not contemplated by Merrell Dow, but also-as I discuss in Part
III-fails to guide lower courts as to the contours of this unpredictable
expansion. And ironically, the same Court that found the tax law
question substantial enough to justify federal-court jurisdiction never-
theless limited its consideration to the jurisdictional question alone,
noting that the case provided "no occasion to pass upon the proper
interpretation of the federal tax provision at issue here."10 3 Resolu-
tion of the "actually disputed and substantial" federal question would
have to wait for another day.
The second important 2005 case involved supplemental jurisdic-
tion. A year after Finley eviscerated pendent-party jurisdiction, Con-
gress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which was designed to overturn Finley
and codify the remainder of the judicially-developed doctrines gov-
erning pendent and ancillary jurisdiction. Section 1367 (a) authorizes
federal courts to exercise "supplemental" jurisdiction over claims tran-
sactionally related to claims over which a federal court does have origi-
nal jurisdiction, including supplemental claims "that involve the
99 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
100 Id. at 311.
101 Id. at 317.
102 Id. at 314. As one reader of this Article noted, the sentence quoted in text is
one that only a lawyer could love.
103 Id. at 311 n.1.
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joinder . . . of additional parties."10 4 Had § 1367(a) been enacted
alone, its broad grant of supplemental jurisdiction would allow multi-
ple plaintiffs or multiple defendants to be joined in a single federal
lawsuit even if only one plaintiff and one defendant met the jurisdic-
tional requirements. By itself, then, § 1367(a) threatens to overturn
long-established doctrines, such as the rule requiring each plaintiff
joined in a diversity-based suit (under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
20) or included in a diversity-based class action (under Rule 23) to
meet the minimum jurisdictional amount. 1 5 These rules prevent a
plaintiff who does not meet the jurisdictional requirements for diver-
sity from piggybacking on the claims of a plaintiff who does meet
them.
Congress thus included in the statute additional provisions limit-
ing § 1367(a). The legislative history makes quite clear that the limita-
tions contained in § 1367(b) were designed to codify and maintain
prior limitations (except for the limitation of Finley itself) on pendent-
party jurisdiction, including the anti-piggybacking doctrines gov-
erning jurisdiction over parties joined under Rules 20 and 23.106
Unfortunately, § 1367(b) is abysmally written.10 7 Its plain lan-
guage conflicts with its undoubted purpose. Section 1367(b) pre-
cludes supplemental jurisdiction over a specified list of claims by or
against additional parties in diversity cases if those claims do not inde-
pendently satisfy the requirements of diversity jurisdiction. 10 8 The list
of prohibited claims includes "claims by plaintiffs against persons
made parties under Rule .. . 20 . .. of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."' 0 9 Thus § 1367(b) maintains the prior judge-made rule
generally barring a diversity plaintiff from suing multiple defendants
unless her claim against each defendant satisfies the requirements of
104 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2000).
105 See Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (Rule 23 class action);
Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583, 589 (1939) (Rule 20 joi=idcr).
106 See Russ v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 808, 819 (E.D. Pa.
1997); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. et at., Compounding or Creating Confusion About Supplemen-
talfurisdiction? A Reply to Professor Freer, 40 EMORY L.J. 943, 961 (1991).
107 I say this with apologies to the trio of respected law professors who drafted the
legislation, one of whom is my co-author. See Rowe et at., supra note 106.
108 The requirements for diversity jurisdiction, specified in 28 U.S.C. § 1332, are
that the parties are from different states and the amount in controversy is above
$75,000. The Supreme Court has long interpreted the statute as also requiring "com-
plete diversity" so that no plaintiff can be a citizen of the same state as any defendant.
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267-68 (1806).
109 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b).
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§ 1332.110 But § 1367(b) does not list-and thus apparently does not
prohibit-claims by parties (plaintiffs) joined under Rule 20, nor does
it refer to Rule 23 at all. It therefore appears on its face to allow multi-
ple plaintiffs to join together even if only one of them meets the juris-
dictional requirements of diversity, thus overruling the anti-
piggybacking doctrines. Between 1995 and 2004, ten federal Courts
of Appeals considered this question, creating a six-to-four circuit
split.",
In Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc.,' 12 a divided Su-
preme Court finally resolved the split, holding that § 1367(b) permits
plaintiffs who do not meet the minimum jurisdictional amount to join
with plaintiffs who do, under both Rule 20 and Rule 23, thus overrul-
ing the earlier anti-piggybacking doctrines. 113 Whatever the merits of
interpreting § 1367 as overruling longstanding jurisdictional doc-
trines, or of privileging text over congressional intent, Allapattah un-
doubtedly expands federal-court jurisdiction, allowing claims that
were previously relegated to state courts. It is therefore part of the
new change in direction.' 1
4
Most recently, the Court expanded jurisdiction by narrowing the
probate exception to federal jurisdiction in Marshall v. Marshall.' 15
The Court has long held (on the basis of perhaps questionable histori-
110 See, e.g., Walter v. Ne. R.R. Co., 147 U.S. 370, 374 (1893); E.R. Squibb & Sons,
Inc. v. Accident & Cas. Ins. Co., 160 F.3d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1998); Libby v. City Nat'l
Bank, 592 F.2d 504, 510 (9th Cir. 1978); Jewell v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 290
F.2d 11, 13 (5th Cir. 1961); see 14B CARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 3704, at 110-16 (Supp. 2006).
111 For circuits that held that § 1367 (b) overruled Clark or Zahn or both, see Olden
v. LaFarge Corp., 383 F.3d 495, 502 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2990 (2005);
Allapattah Servs., Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 333 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2003), affd, 125 S.
Ct. 2611 (2005); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-17 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. dis-
missed, 536 U.S. 979 (2002); Gibson v. Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir.
2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1104 (2002); Stromberg Metal Works, Inc. v. Press Mech., Inc.,
77 F.3d 928, 930-33 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 525 (5th Cir.
1995), affid by an equally divided Court, 529 U.S. 333 (2000). For circuits that held that
§ 1367(b) did not change the prior doctrines, see Rosario Ortega v. Star-Kist Foods, Inc.,
370 F.3d 124, 132-37 (1st Cir. 2004), overruled by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs.,
Inc., 125 3. Ct. 2611 (2005); Timble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 960-62 (8th Cir.
2000); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 221-22 (3d Cir. 1999);
Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631, 637-41 (10th Cir. 1998).
112 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
113 Id. at 2621.
114 As I will discuss in Part Il1, Allapattah is also a prime example of the Court's
heedlessness of the effect of its decisions on the trial courts, because its reasoning
creates more difficulties for those courts than it solves.
115 126 S. Ct. 1735, 1746-49 (2006). The plaintiff, Vickie Lynn Marshall, is better
known by her stage name, Anna Nicole Smith.
2006]
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cal evidence' 16) that federal courts lack 
jurisdiction over matters relat-
ing to wills and estates even if the prerequisites 
for federal jurisdiction
are otherwise met. 
17 Lower courts had applied the doctrine 
in a vari-
ety of circumstances. Some found jurisdiction 
lacking in cases in
which the federal court must rule on 
the validity of the will in order to
decide the issue before it.
1 18 Others denied jurisdiction in cases
which, if brought in state court, would 
have been in probate court
rather than in a court of general jurisdiction.
19 And many ruled
against jurisdiction if they found that 
exercising jurisdiction would
"impair the policies served by the 
probate exception,"
120 including ef-
ficiency and federalism. Thus, for 
example, a widely-cited Seventh
Circuit opinion by Judge Posner found 
federal jurisdiction lacking in
a diversity case alleging tortious interference 
with an expected inheri-
tance. 1 21 In Marshall, however, the 
Court narrowed the probate ex-
ception to cases involving "the probate 
or annulment of a will and the
administration of a decedent's estate" 
or the "disposal] of property
that is in the custody of a state probate 
court."' 22 As with the narrow-
ing of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, 
discussed next, the Court's deci-
sion in Marshall deprived federal district 
courts of a tool they had
been using to manage both federalism 
and overcrowded dockets.
3. Federal Interaction with State-Court 
Proceedings
In addition to Grable and Allapattah, 
the Court in 2005 decided a
third case that significantly expanded 
the jurisdiction of the federal
courts while providing little guidance: 
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic
Industries Corp.,'
123 which narrowed the scope of the 
Rooker-Feldman
doctrine. 1 4 The existence of multiple 
parallel court systems in the
United States creates numerous problems 
for managing litigation, es-
116 See Peter Nicolas, Fighting the Probate 
Mafia: A Dissection of the Probate Exception 
to
Federal CourtJurisdiction, 74 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1479, 1500-02 (2001); John F. Winkler, 
The
Probate Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 
14 PaoB. L.J. 77, 117-36 (1997).
117 See, e.g., Markham v. Allen, 326 
U.S. 490, 494 (1946).
1!8 See, e.g., Tuja v. TuPa, 18 F.3d 
106, 100S 09 (th. 1997); M 
...... Y.
Blakeney, 664 F.2d 433, 434 (5th Cir. 
1981).
119 See, e.g., Reinhardt v. Kelly, 164 
F.3d 1296, 1299-1302 (10th Cir. 1999); 
Bedov.
McGuire, 767 F.2d 305, 306-07 (6th 
Cir. 1985).
120 Dragan v. Miller, 679 F.2d 712, 
715 (7th Cir. 1982).
121 Id. at 713-17.
122 Marshall v. Marshall, 126 S. Ct. 
1735, 1739 (2006).
123 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
124 Id. at 284 (confining the Rooker-Feldman 
doctrine to "cases brought by state-
court losers complaining of injuries 
caused by state-courtjudgments rendered 
before
the district court proceedings commenced 




pecially cases involving litigants who, in the words of the judges who
must deal with them, "refuse to accept adverse decisions"'125, and re-
peatedly subject the courts to "vexatious and unmeritorious litiga-
tion." 126  Both the Younger doctrine and the interjurisdictional
preclusion doctrines of full faith and credit are designed to deal with
some aspects of the problem. But some cases slip through the cracks
of Younger and preclusion, especially since state preclusion doctrines
vary widely. 12 7 If a federal-court plaintiff who has already been to state
court seeks damages (or perhaps even declaratory relief), Younger will
not bar the suit, nor will it bar an injunction that conflicts with a prior
state-court injunction as long as the state proceedings are completed.
And § 1738 might not bar a subsequent federal suit if, for example,
the state judgment is still on appeal, 28 or the state retains the mutual-
ity doctrine and the federal plaintiff adds a new party to the suit, 2 9 or
the federal plaintiff adds a new claim that purportedly arises from the
state judgment itself and therefore could not have been raised in the
state suit.
For twenty years, federal district courts used the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine in an attempt to fill these gaps between Younger and preclu-
sion and prevent litigants from jumping ship to federal court if they
are dissatisfied with the results in state court. The Rooker-Feldman doc-
trine stems from two Supreme Court cases decided sixty years apart.
In Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,130 decided in 1923, the Court held that
lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain "appeals" from state-
court judgments, because 28 U.S.C. § 1257 implicitly reserves that
power to the Supreme Court itselfY3' For six decades, lower courts
applied Rooker sporadically, often using it interchangeably with doc-
trines of preclusion (which, as noted earlier, were in some disar-
ray). 132 Then in 1983, just as the Supreme Court was rediscovering
preclusion, it decided District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,' 1
clarifying Rooker and giving the doctrine its name. In Feldman, the
125 Homola v. McNamara, 59 F.3d 647, 651 (7th Cir. 1995).
126 Fariello v. Campbell, 860 F. Supp. 54, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 1994).
127 On the variety among state preclusion doctrines, see Howard M. Erichson, In-
tejurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MIcH. L. RFNy. 945, 963-83 (1998).
128 See id. at 973 & nn.129-34 (listing states in which judgment pending appeal is
not given preclusive effect).
129 See id. at 966-67 & nn.80-88 (listing states that still adhere to mutuality
doctrine).
130 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
131 Id. at 416.
132 See Williamson B.C. Chang, Rediscovering the Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res
Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINcs LJ. 1337, 1343-44 (1980).
133 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
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Court held that lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to hear "chal-
lenges to state-court decisions in particular cases arising out ofjudicial
proceedings"' 3 4 or to decide questions "inextricably intertwined" with
state-court judgments. 1
35
Despite the lack of any further guidance from the Supreme
Court, the lower federal courts relied on the doctrine to find jurisdic-
tion lacking in more than 500 cases during the 1990s alone.' 3 Most
lower courts described Rooker-Feldman as barring any suit in which fed-
eral relief would nullify or modify the state judgment,' 37 or in which
the federal court could not rule for the plaintiff without holding the
state-court judgment erroneous.' 38 Since Rooker-Feldman is jurisdic-
tional-protecting federalism interests rather than simply ensuring fi-
nality and repose for the prevailing party, as preclusion doctrines
do-lower courts could often use the doctrine not only to fill in the
gaps between preclusion and Younger but also as a backstop when the
affirmative defense of preclusion was inadvertently or deliberately
waived.
The Supreme Court remained acquiescent, denying review when
review was sought, until 2005, when Exxon Mobil limited the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine to "cases brought by state-court losers complaining
of injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the dis-
trict court proceedings commenced and inviting district court review
134 Id. at 486.
135 Id. at 483 n.16.
136 See Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1085, 1087-88 (1999).
137 See, e.g., Gulla v. N. Strabane Twp., 146 F.3d 168, 171 (3d Cir. 1998) ("'void the
state court's ruling"' (quoting FOCUS v. Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas,
75 F.3d 834, 840 (3d Cir. 1996))); Jones v. Crosby, 137 F.3d 1279, 1280 (11th Cir.
1998) ("review, reverse, or invalidate"); Bates v. Jones, 131 F,3d 843, 856 (9th Cir.
1997) (en banc) (Rymer, J., concurring) ("reverse or modify"); Moccio v. N.Y. State
Office of Court Admin., 95 F.3d 195, 198 (2d Cir. 1996) (same); Goetzman v.
Agribank FCB, 91 F.3d 1173, 1177 (8th Cir. 1996) ('would change the state court
result"); Powell v. Powell, 80 F.3d 464, 467 (11th Cir. 1996) ("effectively nullify");
FOCUS, 75 F.3d at 840 ("render that [state] judgment ineffectual"); Charchenko v.
City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th Cir. 1995) ("effectively reverse the state court
decision or void its ruling"); Landers Seed Co. v. Champaign Nat'l Bank, 15 F.3d 729,
732 (7th Cir. 1994) ("effectively reverse"); Howell v. Supreme Court of Tex., 885 F.2d
308, 311 (5th Cir. 1989) ("reverse or modify"); Stern v. Nix, 840 F.2d 208, 212 (3d Cir.
1988) ("effectively reverse"); Anderson v. Colorado, 793 F.2d 262, 263-64 (10th Cir.
1986) ("reverse or modify"; "undo").
138 See, e.g., Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293-95 (6th Cir. 1998);Jordahl v. Dem-
ocratic Party of Va., 122 F.3d 192, 202-03 (4th Cir. 1997); Datz v. Kilgore, 51 F.3d 252,
253-54 (5th Cir. 1995); Keene Corp. v. Cass, 908 F.2d 293, 296-97 (8th Cir. 1990).
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and rejection of those judgments."' 39 Any new claim brought in fed-
eral court and not previously in state court, the Court suggested, pre-
vented the use of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine: "If a federal plaintiff
'present[s] some independent claim, albeit one that denies a legal
conclusion that a state court has reached in a case to which he was a
party,"' then Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction. 1 40 The Court
also appeared to abandon the "inextricably intertwined" part of the
doctrine. 4  One commentator has wittily-but probably accurately-
provided an obituary for Rooker-Feldman. 1
42
4. Standing
The Court began to relax standing barriers in 1997, in Bennett v.
Spear,143 which allowed ranchers and other water-users to challenge an
administrative agency's determination that a particular irrigation pro-
ject had to be curtailed in order to protect the Lost River Sucker and
the Shortnose Sucker, two fish on the endangered species list.14 4 The
Court did not change the standing doctrine itself, but applied both
the prudential and constitutional requirements narrowly. It permit-
ted the suit notwithstanding three plausible government arguments.
The government contended that the harm was uncertain, as it was not
clear whether curtailing the irrigation project would actually reduce
the plaintiffs' water supply.145 It also argued that the cause of the
harm was not the agency's determination but the as-yet-unidentified
decision by a different entity to reduce the allocation of water to the
plaintiffs. 146 Finally, the government challenged the plaintiffs' stand-
ing on the ground that they were not seeking to further the purposes
of the statute (the protection of endangered species) but were instead
challenging the alleged overprotection of endangered species.147
139 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see
also id. at 291 (noting that Rooker-Feldman bars jurisdiction when federal-court plaintiff
is "complaining of an injury caused by the state-court judgment and seeking review
and rejection of that judgment").
140 Id. at 293 (quoting GASH Assocs. v. Vill. of Rosemont, 995 F.2d 726, 728 (7th
Cir. 1993)).
141 See Rowe & Baskauskas, supra note 4, at 11-16.
142 Samuel Bray, Rooker Feldman (1923-2006), 9 GREEN BAG 2D 317 (2006).
143 520 U.S. 154 (1997).
144 Id. at 179.
145 Id. at 167-68.
146 Id. at 168-71.
147 Id. at 171-74.
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Three years later, in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmen-
tal Services,14 8 the Court made clear that Bennett was no aberration. In
this more traditional environmental case, plaintiffs sued a polluter
under the Clean Water Act, claiming that they no longer enjoyed
looking at, fishing from, or swimming in the polluted river.' 49 Over
the dissent of Justice Scalia-who had authored Bennett-the Court
found these allegations sufficient to show injury to the plaintiffs.150
The contrast between Bennett (and Friends of the Earth) and an
earlier case under the same citizen-suit provision of the Endangered
Species Act' 5' illustrates the Court's shift in attitude. In Lujan v. De-
fenders of Wildlife,' 52 the Supreme Court denied standing to environ-
mentalists seeking to challenge a ruling by the Secretary of the
Interior denying extraterritorial application of the Endangered Spe-
cies Act. 15 3 Justice Scalia's majority opinion derided as "fantasy"
15 4
the plaintiffs' stated intent "to return to the [foreign] places they had
visited before," where they would be harmed by the effects of Ameri-
can actions in violation of the Endangered Species Act.155 The real
fantasy, however, is the suggestion that the "injuries" in Lujan, Bennett,
and Friends of the Earth are substantively different. One scholar has
commented that "[i]n a short span ofjust eight years [between Lujan
and Friends of the Earth], the Court appears to have issued a major
retrenchment upon Lujan's logic, if not its holding. '1 5 6 Despite the
148 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
149 Id. at 177.
150 Id. at 183.
151 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2000) ("[A] ny person may commence a civil suit on
his own behalf. . . to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . .who is alleged to be in violation of any
provision of this chapter.").
152 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
153 Id. at 578.
154 Id. at 567.
155 Id. at 564.
156 Maxwell L. Stearns, From Lujan to Laidlaw: A Preliminary Model of Environmental
Standing, 11 Duv'E ENVTrL. L. & POL'Y F. 321, 327 (2001); see also Sam Kalen, Standing
on Its Last Legs: Bennett v. Spear and the Past and Future of Standing in Environmental
Cases, 13J. LAND UsE & ENv-rL. L. 1, 2 (1997) ("[T]he Bennett decision .. .marks a
turning point in the treatment of standing in environmental cases."); id. at 32 ("[ Ben-
nett] may doom the current law of standing."); Shults, supra note 4, at 1003 ("[T]he
decision in Laidlaw is significant because it appears that the Court is opening its doors
to allow in more environmentalists by... signaling a shift toward a less formalistic and
more pragmatic approach to the standing doctrine."); Ronald K. Christensen, Recent
Development, Supreme Court Expands Standing Under the Endangered Species Act, 18 J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 146, 157-58 (1998) ("The [Bennett] decision has signifi-




absence of any formal doctrinal change 
in the law of standing, then,
the trend toward opening federal 
court doors after thirty years of
slamming them shut is apparent in 
this context as well.
II. THE FRUITS OF INEXPERIENCE REDUX: 
DIMINISHING DISCRETION
Coinciding with the expansion of 
jurisdiction is another trend
that has gone largely unnoticed by 
scholars: District court discretion is
diminishing in significant ways. 
The rise of managerial judging has
increased trial judges' discretion in 
some ways,'
57 as has the expanded
scope of summary judgment in the 
wake of a noted trilogy of 1986
Supreme Court cases.
158  Both have been subject to scholarly 
criti-
cism. 159 But these critics, perhaps 
distracted by the focus on manage-
ingness to take the wording of 'any person' 
at face value provides broad opportunity
for citizens to challenge governmental 
decisions and actions under the ESA."); 
Hud-
son P. Henry, Note, A Shift in Citizen 
Suit Standing: Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services, 28 ECOLOGY 
L.Q. 233, 247 (2001) ("Laidlaw signals 
a contin-
uation of the Court's discomfort with 
Justice Scalia's purely private law model 
of litiga-
tion."); Stephen Lanza, Note, The 
Liberalization of Article III Standing: 
The Supreme
Court's Ill-Considered Endorsement of 
Citizen Suits in Friends of the Earth 
v. Laidlaw Envi-
ronmental Services, Inc., 52 ADMIN. 
L. Ruv. 1447, 1461-66 (2000) (" [T]he 
prevailing
reaction [to Laidlaw was that the 
Court has lowered the threshold 
for citizen stand-
ing .... ").
157 See generally Richard L. Marcus, 
Slouching Toward Discretion, 78 NOTRE 
DAME L.
Rtv. 1561, 1574-1615 (2003) (discussing 
the increase in discretionary activity 
and
concluding that the risks of such activity 
have not been realized); Judith Resnik, 
Man-
agerial Judges, 96 HARv. L. REv. 374, 
425-26 (1982) (discussing the greater 
power
given to judges for "case management").
158 See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 
U.S. 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita 
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 
475 U.S.
574 (1986). See generally Martin H. 
Redish, Summary judgment and the 
Vanishing Trial:
Implications of the Litigation Matrix, 57 
STAN. L. REv. 1329 (2005) (describing 
and criti-
cizing the increased use of summary 
judgment in the wake of the 1986 
trilogy); David
L. Shapiro, The Story of Celotex: The Role 
of Summary Judgment in the Administration 
of
Civil Justice, in CIviL PROCEDURE STORIES 
343, 359-69 (Kevin M. Clermont ed., 
2004)
(describing Celotex and its consequences); 
Adam N. Steinman, The Irrepressible 
Myth of
Celotex: Reconsidering Summary Judgment 
Burdens Twenty Years After the Trilogy, 
63 WASH.
& LEE L. REv. 81, 86-88 (2006) (describing 
frequency of judicial citation to 
Celotex).
159 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff 
& George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts 
About Sum-
mary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 74 
(1990); Redish, supra note 158, at 
1339-55; Resnik,
supra note 157, at 376-80; Jay Tidmarsh, 
Pound's Century, and Ours, 81 NOTRE 
DAME L.
REV. 513, 558-62 (2006). But see David 
L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look 
at the Theory
and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1969, 1991-98 (1989); 
see also Thomas M.
Mengler, The Theory of Discretion in 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 74 IOWA 
L. REv. 413
(1989) (examining discretion in 
the context of evidence rules); Shapiro, 
supra note
158, at 363-64 (noting but not necessarily 
endorsing criticism of the trilogy 
of cases).
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
rial judging, have missed a parallel diminution in another kind of
discretion: discretion over the adjudicative process itself.
There are many types of discretionary decisions. 60 Indeed, the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure themselves deliberately incorporate
much of the flexibility of the old equity regime, and judicial discretion
is therefore a leitmotif of federal civil procedure. 16' I focus here on a
narrow type of discretion, one limited to matters in which trial judges
arguably have a special expertise when compared to appellate judges:
managing dockets, policing lawyers and litigants, and mediating judi-
cial federalism. Discretion in these three areas plays a large role in
judges' ability to resolve cases quickly and efficiently, something that
managerial judging has not been shown to accomplish. 162 It is also
adjudicative, in the sense that discretionary decisions in these contexts
take the traditional form of a judicial decision (often with a written
opinion) reviewable on appeal, and are therefore subject to all of the
usual procedural safeguards. Managerial discretion, on the other
hand, largely takes the form of judicial pressure on the parties to set-
tle cases and does not manifest itself in a judicial decision, nor is it
ever reviewed by'an appellate court. 16 3 Thus, in this Part I try to show
that despite the increase in one type of district court discretion, appel-
late courts have been taking from trial judges' decisions that ought to
remain largely within a district court's discretion.1 6 4
160 Marcus, supra note 157, at 1565-74 (describing a typology of judicial
discretion).
161 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 975 (1987).
162 See JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CVIL JUSTICE REFoim Acr 87-93 (1996);James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery
Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L.
REv. 613, 676-82 (1998).
163 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 157, at 417-31 (criticizing the rise of managerial
judging, partly because it is unreviewable). Although sumrnmaryjudgment is adjudica-
tive rather than managerial, it shares several characteristics with managerial judging
that distinguish it from the discretionary decisions I examine in the Article. First, like
managerial judging, it is largely a pre-trial tool. More important, however, is that
courts of appeals have largely abdicated their oversight of trial court rulings on sum-
maryjudgment, see, for example, Tidmarsh, supra note 159, at 555-56 & nn. 179-85,
which undermines the adjudicative safeguards.
164 It is possible to argue that some diminution of discretion is the inevitable prod-
uct of any legal system: that any system of discretion slowly accretes into a system of
rules unless care is taken to guard against this hardening of the legal arteries. What I
suggest in this Article is that district courtjudges are in a better position to recognize




At the same time that many circuits-and, eventually, the Su-
preme Court-were interpreting § 1367(b) to expand the scope of
federal jurisdiction, many were interpreting § 1367(c) to contract the
district courts' discretion to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdic-
tion. This is problematic because district courts need flexibility to re-
solve cases efficiently, especially when their jurisdiction is expanding.
Supplemental jurisdiction also has implications for judicial federal-
ism, insofar as it determines whether state-law claims will be litigated
in state or federal court.
Before the enactment of § 1367, supplemental jurisdiction was a
judge-made doctrine governed largely by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.165 In Gibbs, the Supreme Court
delineated the reach of the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction,
and then noted that it "need not be exercised in every case in which it
is found to exist," because supplemental jurisdiction "is a doctrine of
discretion, not of plaintiff's right." 66 Citing considerations of 'judi-
cial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants," the Court listed
several circumstances favoring or counseling against the exercise of
jurisdiction over state-law claims. 167 Twenty years later, the Court
noted that under Gibbs, "the pendent jurisdiction doctrine is designed
to enable courts to handle cases involving state-law claims in the way
that will best accommodate the values of economy, convenience, fair-
ness, and comity."
168
Section 1367(c) addresses the Gibbs discretion ambiguously. The
statute provides that "the district courts may decline to exercise sup-
plemental jurisdiction" in four listed circumstances. 69 The first three
merely list the circumstances Gibbs announced as examples of factors
mitigating against the exercise of jurisdiction. 170  The last,
§ 1367(c) (4), confers on district courts discretion to decline jurisdic-
tion "in exceptional circumstances, [if] there are other compelling
reasons for declining jurisdiction.
11 17
1
The inevitable question is whether to interpret § 1367(c)'s list--
including "exceptional circumstances"-as codifying or as narrowing
165 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
166 Id. at 726.
167 Id. at 726-27.
168 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 351 (1988). The Court held
that the discretion included the district court's decision whether to dismiss or to re-
mand a state-law claim. Id.
169 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2000).
170 Id. § 1367(c)(1)-(3).
171 Id. § 1367(c) (4).
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the virtually unfettered discretion accorded the district court by Gibbs.
The legislative history suggests a congressional intent to leave the dis-
cretion unchanged. 172 The language, however, is ambiguous: Is
§ 1367 (c) (4) a somewhat inartfully worded catch-all exception, under
which the court retains full discretion to consider such factors asjudi-
cial economy and convenience, or is it a narrow provision requiring
courts to identify circumstances (and reasons against the exercise of
jurisdiction) analogous to those described in the first three subsec-
tions of § 1367(c)?
At least four courts of appeals have read § 1367(c) as curtailing
district court discretion.173 Two of them explicitly acknowledge that
their interpretation deprives district courts of discretion previously
held.174 Although the doctrinal niceties differ somewhat, these four
courts have held that district courts may decline to exercise supple-
mental jurisdiction only under one of the three specifically enumer-
ated circumstances or an equivalently exceptional situation. As the
Ninth Circuit put it, "declining jurisdiction outside of subsection
(c) (1)-(3) should be the exception, rather than the rule."17 5 In par-
ticular, a district court may not decline jurisdiction for reasons ofjudi-
cial economy or convenience unless it first finds the presence of the
listed circumstances: "[W]hile supplemental jurisdiction must be exer-
cised in the absence of any of the four factors of section 1367(c),
when one or more of these factors is present, the additional Gibbs con-
siderations may, by their presence or absence, influence the court in
its decision concerning the exercise of such discretion."1 76 A fifth
court of appeals, while not deciding the precise reach of § 1367 (c) or
its relationship to the Gibbs factors, has held that § 1367(c) (2) is "a
limited exception to the operation of the doctrine of pendentjurisdic-
tion."1' 77 No court of appeals has yet upheld a district court's declin-
ing of jurisdiction outside of the enumerated circumstances. 178
172 See Shirin Malkani, Upside Down and Inside Out: Appellate Review of Discretion
Under the Supplementaljurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 1997 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 661,
674-79.
173 See tar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurrier, Inc., 140 F.3d 442,
447-48 (2d Cir. 1998); McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994); Exec-
utive Software N. Am., Inc. v. U.S. Dist. Court, 24 F.3d 1545, 1555-61 (9th Cir. 1994);
Palmer v. Hosp. Auth., 22 F.3d 1559, 1569 (1Ith Cir. 1994).
174 Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 447; Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1556.
175 Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1558; see also Itar-Tass, 140 F.3d at 448 (quoting
Executive Software, 24 F.3d at 1558).
176 Palmer, 22 F.3d at 1569.
177 Borough of W. Mifflin v. Lancaster, 45 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 1995).
178 One commentator suggests that six circuits have "interpreted the statute as a
codification of Gibbs" and as conferring "unlimited discretion" on district courts.
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The combined effect of this interpretation of § 1367(c) and the
Supreme Court's interpretation of 1367(b) in Allapattah is an illustra-
tion of the intersection between expanding jurisdiction and shrinking
discretion: More claims will fall within a district court's jurisdiction
and it will have less discretion to dismiss or remand them. Jurisdiction
over state-law claims is simultaneously expanded and made
mandatory-in circumstances in which it was previously either discre-
tionary or altogether nonexistent. In particular, the courts of appeals
are depriving the district courts of the power to decide whether,
under all the circumstances, it is sensible and efficient to let a state
court decide state-law claims between two nondiverse parties.
Although the Supreme Court has yet to weigh in on the
§ 1367(c) controversy, it has shut down other district court attempts
to manage exploding dockets. For example, it has recently rejected
the practice of "hypothetical standing," which allowed a court to as-
sume the plaintiff had standing if it was clear that the case should
ultimately be dismissed on the merits. 179 Hypothetical standing is an
efficient method of resolving easy cases, because it allows courts to
avoid more difficult-but ultimately irrelevant-issues, and it also
serves to prevent a proliferation of possibly conflicting lower court
opinions on standing. But in Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ-
Rachel Ellen Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) and the Debate Over the District
Court's Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. REv. 111, 120-21
(2001). In four of the cases cited, one of the listed factors was unarguably present.
See Musson Theatrical, Inc. v. Fed. Express Corp., 89 F.3d 1244, 1254 (6th Cir. 1996)
("[lt was an abuse of discretion to retain the state-law claims on a theory of supple-
mental jurisdiction after dismissal of the federal claims upon which supplemental ju-
risdiction depended."); Anglemyer v. Hamilton County Hosp., 58 F.3d 533, 541 (10th
Cir. 1995) ("After resolving all her federal claims, the district court exercised its dis-
cretion and dismissed Ms. Anglemyer's remaining state law claims. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(c) (3) .... ); Rodriguez v. Doral Mortgage Corp., 57 F.3d 1168, 1177 (1st Cir.
1995) (noting that a district court may, in its discretion, retain state-law claim "not-
withstanding the early demise of all foundational federal claims"); Diven v. Amalga-
mated Transit Union Int'l & Local 689, 38 F.3d 598, 599 (D.C. Cir. 1994) ("Since
appellants' non-federal claims against the local union predominate over the related
federal cause of action against the national union, we affirm the district court's [re-
fusal to exercise supplemental jurisdiction]."). In one of the cases cited, the court
affirmed the district court's decision to retainjurisdiction on grounds ofjudicial econ-
omy (and its dismissal of the state-law claim on the merits), despite the dismissal of
the federal claim before trial. Brazinski v. Amoco Petroleum Additives Co., 6 F.3d
1176, 1182 (7th Cir. 1993). Finally, in Borough of West Mifflin, discussed supra note 177
and accompanying text, the court of appeals reversed a district court's remand of an
entire case (including the federal claim) to the state court from which it had been
removed, and remanded to the district court for a determination of whether the state-
law claims substantially predominated over the federal claim. 45 F.3d at 790.
179 See, e.g., United States v. Troescher, 99 F.3d 933, 934 n.1 (9th Cir. 1996).
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ment,18 ° the Supreme Court put an end to hypothetical standing, de-
manding that courts determine standing before the merits in every
case. 181
One might defend the result in Steel by arguing that a court's
constitutional lack of authority to adjudicate in the absence of stand-
ing necessitates the cumbersome and inefficient rule. However, the
Court's commitment to initial resolution of threshold questions of ad-
judicative authority is inconsistent. Within two years after Steel, the
Supreme Court approved presumptions of adjudicatory authority in
three situations similar to that disallowed in Steel. Most analogously,
the Court allowed a court to resolve the statutory question of class
certification before deciding whether the putative class members had
standing. 18 2 It also ruled that a district court can decide "a straightfor-
ward personal jurisdiction issue" before determining whether it has
subject matter jurisdiction if the latter "raises a difficult and novel
question. 1 83 Finally, courts are permitted to finesse the question of
state sovereign immunity by holding instead that as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation, the federal cause of action does not reach states as
defendants. 
184
Each of the four cases-including Steel-involves the interaction
between a difficult question of the federal courts' constitutional au-
thority and another, easier, issue. Both efficiency and the canon of
avoiding unnecessary constitutional questions' 8 5 cut in favor of al-
lowing the federal court to reach the easier, and dispositive, question
by presuming its own authority to act. The holding in Steel is thus
inconsistent with the other cases, as well as with the avoidance
doctrine. 
1 8 6
Why, then, was the Court so unwilling to allow courts flexibility in
the context of hypothetical standing? I suggest that it is because each
180 523 U.S. 83 (1998).
181 Id. at 94. For discussions of Steel Co., see, for example,Jack H. Friedenthal, The
Crack in the Steel Case, 68 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 258, 260-66 (2000); Scott C. Idleman,
The Demise of Hypothetical Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, 52 VAND. L. REV. 235, 270-349
(1999); Joan Steinman, After Steel Co.: "Hypothetical Jurisdiction" in the Federal Appellate
Courts, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 855, 857-77 (2001).
182 Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1999).
183 Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 588 (1999).
184 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. U.S. ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 779-80 (2000).
185 Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
186 For an argument that in other contexts the Supreme Court is similarly forcing
lower courts to decide ultimately unnecessary constitutional questions, in violation of
the avoidance doctrine, see Thomas Healy, The Rise of Unnecessary Constitutional Rul-
ings, 83 N.C. L. REV. 847, 851 (2005).
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of the other three cases involved the order 
of decision of two purely
legal questions. What is unique about 
Steel is not that it involves a
threshold question of adjudicatory authority, 
but that it juxtaposes the
purely legal question of standing against 
the mixed questions of law
and fact that make up the decision on 
the merits. Supreme Court
Justices with too little practical experience 
were too quick to assume
that the legal question must be paramount, 
and thus saw hypothetical
standing as fundamentally different from 
the other cases in which
lower courts resolved questions in a 
somewhat unorthodox order.
In Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes 
& Lerach,187 the Su-
preme Court disapproved another common 
practice lower courts had
developed to deal efficiently with complex 
litigation. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a), "[w]hen civil actions involving 
one or more common ques-
tions of fact are pending in different districts," 
the Judicial Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation'
8 may transfer them "to any district for coordi-
nated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 
1 9 Section 1407(a) fur-
ther provides that the actions "shall be 
remanded" to their separate
transferor courts for trial, but other 
provisions contradict that
mandatory language and suggest greater 
flexibility. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a), district courts retain the power 
to "transfer any civil action
to any other district . .. where it might 
have been brought," if the
transfer is "[f] or the convenience of 
parties and witnesses" or "in the
interest of justice.
'1 90 Rule 14(b) of the Panel's own rules 
provides
that cases should be remanded "unless 
ordered transferred by the
transferee judge to the transferee or 
other district under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a) or 28 U.S.C. § 1406.'191 Relying 
on § 1404(a) and Panel
Rule 14(b), transferee courts-with the 
approval of many courts of
appeals-began in the early 1970s to 
retain some consolidated cases
for trial) 92 Efficiency was a primary 
concern. 93 Transferee courts
187 523 U.S. 26 (1998).
188 The Panel is created pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1407(d) (2000).
189 Id. § 1407(a).
190 Id. § 1404(c).
191 Rule 14(b), Rules of Procedure 
of the J.P.M.L.
192 See, e.g., In reAm. Cont'l Corp./Lincoln 
Sav. & Loan Sec. Litig., 102 F.3d 1524,
1531-35 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub 
nor. Lexecon, 523 U.S. 26; In re Fine 
Paper Antitrust
Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 818-20 (3d Cir. 
1982); Pfizer, Inc. v. Lord, 447 F.2d 
122, 123 (2d
Cir. 1971) (per curium); see also MANUAL 
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) 
§ 31.132,
at 254 (1995) (noting that a "transferee 
judge may transfer cases for trial to any 
dis-
trict, including the § 1407 transferee 
district, permitted by 28 U.S.C. 1404"); 
Patricia
D. Howard, A Guide to Multidistrict Litigation, 
124 F.R.D. 479, 497 (1989) ("it is not
uncommon for a transferee judge 
... to transfer to his own . . . district. 
. . the actions
which were previously assigned to him 
or her."); Stanley A. Weigel, The Judicial 
Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation, Transferor 
Courts and Transferee Courts, 78 F.R.D. 
575, 581 n.42
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used this technique judiciously: As of September 30, 1995, transferee
courts had retained only 279 of the 3,787 cases that ultimately re-
quired a trial. 94 Nevertheless, in 1998 the Supreme Court in Lexecon
interpreted the statutory scheme to prohibit a transferee court from
transferring cases to itself.195 The Court relied on the mandatory lan-
guage of § 1407(a), rejecting the argument-which serves to recon-
cile the apparently contradictory provisions of § 1407(a) and
§ 1404(a)-that § 1407(a) limits the Panel rather than the transferee
court. 19 6 The Supreme Court in Lexecon thus interpreted ambiguous
statutory language to deprive trial courts of a longstanding tool for
managing litigation. Moreover, there is at least some indication that
Lexecon, while decreasing adjudicative discretion, has resulted in in-
creased use (or misuse) of managerial discretion: Transferee courts,
reluctant to send cases back to transferor courts for trial, instead hold
them for many years trying to get the parties to settle.197
B. Dealing with Lawyers and Litigants
Appellate courts have also narrowed district court flexibility in
dealing with both multi-forum litigation and difficult lawyers. Manag-
ing obstreperous, unethical, or overly litigious parties and attorneys is
a pervasive problem for trial courts. The variety of factual settings and
the ingenuity of lawyers ensures that new questions will continue to
arise. The choice of tools is thus best left to the discretion of trial
court judges. In particular, trial court judges are best able to devise
solutions to two perennial problems: repeat litigants and lawyers who
skate close to (or over) ethical lines. But appellate courts have not
seen it that way.
Parties who lose in federal court sometimes bring the same or a
related suit in state court. One response to this problem is simply to
(1977) (listing authorities supporting a transferee judge's ability to transfer an action
to the transferee district for trial).
193 See, e.g., Am. Contl Corp., 102 F.3d at 1532 ("Permitting the transferee court to
transfer a case to itself upon completion of its pretrial work often promotes efficiency
in the disposition of the case or cases."); Pfizer, 447 F.2d at 125 ("[The districtjudge]
indicated that he felt that because of the complexity of these cases the interests of
judicial efficiency made it highly desirable that the judge who conducted the pretrial
proceedings continue as the trial judge.").
194 Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 33 (citing ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS,
JUoImAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 32 (1995)).
195 Id.
196 Id. at 35-36.






leave the solution to the state court, 
which must apply federal law to
determine whether the federal judgment 
should be given preclusive
effect. But neither Congress nor the 
courts have found this to be an
adequate response, in part because 
it is time-consuming and ineffi-
cient and in part because of a lingering 
mistrust of state courts in this
context. Thus, the Anti-Injunction 
Act, 9 8 which generally bars fed-
eral courts from enjoining state-court 
proceedings, includes what is
commonly called the "relitigation exception"
9 9. A federal court is
permitted to enjoin state proceedings 
in order to "protect or effectu-
ate itsjudgments.
' 200 Under this provision, the federal court 
itself de-
termines whether its prior judgment should 
be given preclusive effect,
and enjoins the state suit if 
it answers in the affirmative
-.2 ,
Although issuing an injunction against 
a state proceeding might
be an appropriate response in some 
circumstances, it has drawbacks.
It lacks finality, insofar as it enjoins 
the prosecution of the suit but
does not actually dismiss the case. 
To the extent that the enjoined
party might try to evade the injunction 
(perhaps by filing suit in an-
other jurisdiction), enforcement demands 
more district court re-
sources, including a potentially difficult 
and expensive contempt
hearing. Moreover, issuing an injunction 
against a state-court pro-
ceeding might be seen as intruding on 
state-court independence, and
might therefore create additional friction 




For these reasons, many lower courts 
developed an alternative to
enjoining a preclusion-barred state-court 
suit. Using either the re-
moval statutes
203 or the All Writs Act,
20 4 these courts removed the case
198 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (2000).
199 See, e.g., Rivet v. Regions Banh, 
522 U.S. 470, 478 n.3 (1998).
200 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
201 See, e.g., Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon 
Corp., 486 U.S. 140, 146-47 (1988).
202 See, e.g., NAACP v. Metro. Council, 
125 F.3d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1997), 
va-
cated, 522 U.S. 1145 (1998), reinstated, 
144 F.3d 1168 (8th Cir. 1998); Yonkers 
Racing
Corp. v. City of Yonkers, 858 F.2d 855, 
864 (2d Cir. 1988).
203 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441-47 (2000 & 
Supp. III 2003); see, e.g., Brand Name 
Prescrip-
tion Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 
599, 604, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); Carpenter 
v. Wich-
ita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist. 44 F.3d 362, 
365 (5th Cir. 1995); Ultramar Am. 
Ltd. v.
Dwelle, 900 F.2d 1412, 1413 (9th Cir. 
1990); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Sarkisian, 
794
F.2d 754, 757 (2d Cir. 1986).
204 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2000); see, 
e.g., Montgomery v. Aetna Plywood, 
Inc. 231
F.3d 399, 410-12 (7th Cir. 2000); Bylinski 
v. Allen Park, 169 F.3d 1001, 1003 (6th 
Cir.
1999); NAACP v. Metro. Council, 144 
F.3d 1168, 1171-72 (8th Cir. 1998); 
Agent Or-
ange Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 
1431 (2d Cir. 1993); At. Coast Demolition 
&
Recycling, Inc. v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 
988 F. Supp. 486, 495-97 (D.N.J. 1997);
Nowling v. Aero Servs. Int'l, Inc., 734 
F. Supp. 733, 737-38 (E.D. La. 1990). 
One
commentator, writing in 1999, concluded 
that "[n]early every court which has consid-
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from state to federal court and then dismissed it as precluded. The
availability of three options-leaving it to the state court, enjoining
the suit, or removing the case-gave the district courts the flexibility
to deal with each individual case in its own context. Between 1998
and 2002, however, the Supreme Court closed off the removal option.
In Rivet v. Regions Bank2°5 it ruled that the removal statutes did not
authorize this type of res judicata removal, 2 6 and in Syngenta Crop Pro-
tection, Inc. v. Henson20 7 it held the All Writs Act unavailable. 208 Fed-
eral courts faced with litigants who won't take no for an answer must
now always invoke the more cumbersome and weighty injunctive
remedy.
Some lawyers and litigants go further than simply filing duplica-
tive state-court suits. In our adversary system, some lawyers will inevi-
tably be tempted to act unethically to further their clients' interests.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 places primary responsibility for
policing litigation-related lapses in the hands of district court judges,
and confers on them great flexibility and discretion. After multiple
amendments, Rule 11 on its face now allows judges to impose sanc-
tions on their own initiative or in response to a motion, and gives
them almost unlimited discretion to determine appropriate sanc-
tions.20 9 As long as the procedural niceties are observed, courts im-
posing sanctions on lawyers (as opposed to parties) are constrained
only by the requirement that the sanction "[slhall be limited to what
is sufficient to deter repetition of [the] conduct or comparable con-
duct by others similarly situated."2
10
Rule 11 also specifies the types of attorney conduct that may re-
sult in sanctions. Before 1983, the Rule permitted sanctions only if an
attorney acted with subjective bad faith. 211 In that year, Rule 11 was
amended to require attorneys to act "reasonabl[y] under the circum-
ered this question has concluded that the All Writs Act may serve as an independent
basis for removal jurisdiction .... " Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, Removal Jurisdiction
and the All Writs Act, 148 U. PA. L. REv. 401, 411 (1999) (cataloging and criticizing the
courts' use of the All Writs Act for this purpose). Other commentators also criticized
the use of the All Writs Act to remove cases. See, e.g., Joan Steinman, The Newest Fron-
tier. of Judicial Activism: Removal Under the All Writs Act, 80 B.U. L. REv. 773, 815-20
(2000).
205 522 U.S. 470 (1998).
206 Id. at 472.
207 537 U.S. 28 (2002).
208 Id. at 34.
209 FED. R. Crv. P. II(c).
210 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
211 E.g., Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1536 (9th
Cir. 1986).
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stances," which courts interpreted as mandating 
an objective reasona-
bleness test.21
2 Due to other problems in administering 
Rule 11 after
the 1983 amendments, the Rule was 
amended again in 1993.213 Al-
though the substantive standard of reasonableness 
was retained,
21 4 va-
rious procedural changes were made. 
In particular, the 1993
amendments provide that in response 
to a motion for sanctions, the
party whose submission is challenged 
has a twenty-one-day "safe har-
bor" during which to withdraw the 
challenged submission without
penalty.2 1 5 If the judge initiates Rule 
11 proceedings sua sponte, how-
ever (by issuing a show cause 
order), there is no safe harbor 
period.21 6
Allowing the judge to impose sanctions 
sua sponte-after a hear-
ing-serves the basic goals of Rule 
11 by increasing the likelihood of
sanctions, thus adding to the Rule's 
deterrent value. Additionally, it
prevents repeat players from ignoring 
each others' violations out of a
willingness to play along, a fear of later 
retaliation, or an unwillingness
to risk antagonizing the judge or delaying 
the proceedings. And, as
the Supreme Court has noted, the district 
courts, "on the front lines
of litigation," are "best acquainted with 
the local bar's litigation prac-
tices and thus best suited to determine 
when a sanction is war-
ranted."21 7 The reasonableness standard, 
moreover, allows courts to
impose sanctions that might deter future 
violations, without having to
call into question the good faith of the 
sanctioned party. Imposition
of sanctions, then, is quintessentially 
a situation in which to recognize
the trial courts' relative superiority.
Nevertheless, several courts of appeals 
have severely limited the
district courts' discretion in Rule 11 
cases. The Second Circuit has
done so most unequivocally. In In re 
Pennie & Edmonds LLP,
218 that
court reversed a district court's sua sponte 
imposition of sanctions for
the submission of false affidavits.
219 The circumstances strongly sug-
gested that the lawyers knew that their 
clients' affidavits were un-
true. 220 The district judge, apparently 
unwilling to tarnish the
212 See, e.g., id. at 1536-38; Stevens v. Lawyers 
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of N.C., 789 
F.2d
1056, 1060 (4th Cir. 1986); Rodgers 
v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 
F.2d 194, 205
(7th Cir. 1985); Eastway Constr. Corp. 
v. City of N.Y., 762 F.2d 243, 253-54 
(2d Cir.
1985).
213 See Theodore C. Hirt, A Second 
Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1007,
1009-12 (1999).
214 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
215 See FFD. R. Crv. P. I I (c) (1) (A).
216 SeeFED. R. Civ. P. I I(c) (l) (B).
217 Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx 
Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 404 (1990).
218 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
219 Id. at 93.
220 See id. at 87.
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reputation of a well-respected law firm with a finding of subjective bad
faith, found that the attorneys had acted in good faith but unreasona-
bly, and imposed a nonmonetary sanction. 22 1 The court of appeals
reversed-over the dissent of a district judge sitting by designation-
holding that because of the absence of a safe harbor period, sanctions
imposed by ajudge sua sponte require bad faith rather than objective
unreasonableness. 222 Because the district court had found the attor-
neys to be acting in good faith, the court of appeals held that no sanc-
tions could be imposed.
223
While no other circuit has yet explicitly adopted the Second Cir-
cuit's approach, several seem to be moving in that direction. The
Eighth Circuit, for example, held in MHC Investment Co. v. Racom
Corp.2 24 that the lack of a safe harbor means the Rule 11 standards
should be "applied with particular strictness" if the judge imposes sanc-
tions sua sponte. 225 Less than a year later, however, the court cited
MHC as holding that sanctions imposed sua sponte should be reviewed
with particular strictness. 226 The shift transfers responsibility for
punctiliousness from the district court to the court of appeals. Two
other circuits have similarly applied a heightened standard of review
to the sua sponte imposition of sanctions.227 Only the First Circuit has
rejected the Second Circuit's approach, but in a case in which it nev-
ertheless reversed the district court's imposition of sanctions as an
abuse of discretion. 22 8
221 The law firm involved was required to circulate the court's opinion to each
lawyer in the firm, along with "a memorandum that states that it is firm policy that its
partners and associates adhere to the highest ethical standards and that if a lawyer's
adherence to those standards results in the loss of a client, large or small, the lawyer
will not suffer any adverse consequence." Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No.
98 CIV 10175(JSM), 2002 WL 59434, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 16, 2002), vacated sub nom.
Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d 86.
222 For criticism of the court of appeals' decision in Pennie & Edmonds, see Jerold
S. Solovy et al., Sanctions Under Rule 11: A Cross-Circuit Comparison, 37 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
727, 755 (2004); Gregory P.Joseph, 'Sua Sponte' Sanctions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2003, at
B6.
223 Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 93.
224 323 F.3d 620 (8th Cir. 2003).
225 Id. at 623 (emphasis added).
226 Norsyn, Inc. v. Desai, 351 F.3d 825, 831 (8th Cir. 2003).
227 See Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler, A.G., 331 F.3d 1251, 1255 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (re-
versing district court imposition of sanctions but explicitly declining to decide
whether to adopt Second Circuit's "bad faith" requirement); Hunter v. Earthgrains
Co. Bakery, 281 F.3d 144, 153 (4th Cir. 2002) (reversing district court imposition of
sanctions, and citing in support a case that held only that the standards should be
applied with particular stringency).
228 Young v. City of Providence, 404 F.3d 33, 40 (lst Cir. 2005).
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Both the requirement of bad faith and the 
heightened standard
of review illustrate the trend toward limiting 
trial judges' discretion
and flexibility in dealing with the "front 
lines" of litigation.
229 They
also demonstrate the courts of appeals' 
failure to recognize the rela-
tive superiority of district courts in striking 
the balance-on a case-by-
case basis-between deterring unjustifiable 
behavior and permitting
zealous representation. Every appellate 
reversal of a trial court's im-
position of sanctions sends a clear message 
encouraging lawyers to use
ever more aggressive adversarial tactics-and 
a clearer message to dis-
trict court judges that it is their conduct 
which will be reviewed on
appeal.
C. Judicial Federalism
Many of the developments described above 
implicate questions of
the appropriate allocation of authority 
between state and federal
courts, often known as judicial federalism. 
Interpretations of § 1331
and § 1367(b) set the outer boundaries 
of federal-court authority, and
cases outside that authority must be 
litigated in state court if at all.
Other doctrines-including Younger, 
preclusion, Rooker-Feldman, dis-
cretionary supplemental jurisdiction, and 
"resjudicata removal"-gov-
ern the relationship between federal 
and state courts in particular
cases.
One aspect of judicial federalism, 
however, provides an even
more direct example of the superior 
knowledge of trial judges over
appellate judges: The Erie doctrine. 
Under Erie,23
0 federal courts sit-




times state law is unclear, and the federal 
court is forced to make what
is often labeled an "Erie guess"
23 2 : the court applies its best under-
229 There is a lively scholarly debate 
about whether discretion under Rule 
11 is
good or bad. See, e.g., Maureen N. Armour, 
Practice Makes Perfect:Judicial Discretion 
and
the 1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HcFsrRA 
L. REv. 677 (1996); Maureen Armour,
Rethinking Judicial Discretion: Sanctions 
and the Conundrum of the Close Case, 50 
SMU L.
R v. 493, 554-68 (1997); Stephen 
B. Burbank, The Transformation 
of American Civil
Procedure: The Example of Rule 11, 137 
U. PA. L. REv. 1925, 1929-41 (1989); 
Victor H.
Kramer, Viewing Rule 11 as a Tool 
to Improve Professional Responsibility, 
75 MINN. L. RPv.
793 (1990); Judith L. Maute, Sporting 
Theory of Justice: Taming Adversary 
Zeal with a
Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CONN. L. 
REv. 7, 28-30 (1987); William W. Schwarzer,
Rule 11: Entering a New Era, 28 LoY. 
L.A. L. REv. 7, 36-37 (1994); Carl 
Tobias, Reconsid-
ering Rule 11, 46 U. MiAmi L. REv. 
855, 879-80, 889-90 (1992); Georgene 
M. Vairo,
Rule 11: Where We Are and Where We 
Are Going, 60 FoRDHAM L. REv. 475, 
491-92 (1991).
230 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
231 Id. at 78.
232 See, e.g., Rx.com Inc. v. Hartford 
Fire Ins. Co., 364 F. Supp. 2d 609, 
613 (S.D.
Tex. 2005); Genecin v. Genecin, 
363 F. Supp. 2d 306, 320 (D. Conn. 
2005); Amoco
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standing of what the state's supreme court would hold under the same
circumstances. Until 1991, almost every court of appeals explicitly de-
ferred to district court interpretations of state law rather than decid-
ing de novo the substance of state law.2 33 In Salve Regina College v.
Russelt234 in 1991, however, the Supreme Court held that "a court of
appeals should review de novo a district court's determination of state
law."235
Salve Regina notwithstanding, the rule of deference made sense,
because the competencies of the federal district and appellate judges
are quite different when it comes to state law. Federal district judges
have almost always previously practiced law in the states in which they
sit, and have often served on state courts. 2 36 In Salve Regina College
itself, the district court judge to whom the court of appeals had-
inappropriately, according to the Supreme Court-given deference
had been a state trial judge for almost twenty years. 237 Court of ap-
peals judges, on the other hand, are drawn from a larger geographic
area, and only by chance might have any legal experience in the state
whose law is at issue. And once ascending the bench, a trial court
judge is likely to hear many more cases from her own state than will
any member-or any three-judge panel-of the court of appeals, and
Ukrservice v. Am. Meter Co., 312 F. Supp. 2d 681, 693 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Baycol
Prod. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209 (D. Minn. 2003); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Woodall,
304 F. Supp. 2d 1364, 1380 (S.D. Ga. 2003); Stein Corp. v. Johnson & Higgins, 196
F.R.D. 653, 658 (D. Utah 2000); Emig v. Am. Tobacco Co., Inc., 184 F.R.D. 379, 394
(D. Kan. 1998); Imperial Cas. & Indem. Co. v. Radiator Specialty Co., 862 F. Supp.
1437, 1443 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Nichols v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 706 F.
Supp. 1309, 1322 (M.D. Tenn. 1989); Clemco Indus. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co.,
665 F. Supp. 816, 821 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Odgers v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 609 F. Supp.
867, 870 (E.D. Mich. 1985); Magnaleasing, Inc. v. Staten Island Mall, 76 F.R.D. 559,
563 n.6 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see also Dolores K. Sloviter, A Federalfudge Views Diversity Juris-
diction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REv. 1671, 1675-83 (1992) (describing
the effect of federal courts' "Erie-guesses" upon state courts and state law).
233 See Dan T. Coenen, To Defer or Not to Defer: A Study of Federal Circuit Court Defer-
ence to District Court Rulings on State Law, 73 MINN. L. REv. 899, 963-1017 (1989) (con-
cluding, based on analysis of more than 550 cases, that all but two circuits-the Ninth,
which had rejected the rule of deference, and the Federal Circuit, which had never
considered it-adopted some version of deference to district court determinations on
state law); see also Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) (concluding
that as of 1991, all circuits except the Third and Ninth adopted the rule of
deference).
234 499 U.S. 225.
235 Id. at 231.
236 See Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy
of State Procedural Rules, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 243, 287 (2003).
237 Salve Regina, 499 U.S. at 229.
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thus the trial judge will also have more current familiarity with state
law.
What Salve Regina College does, then, is to take a question that
district court judges are better equipped than appellate judges to an-
swer, and transfer ultimate responsibility for that question to the ap-
pellate judges. While technically not a question of "discretion," this
change in the law perfectly captures the trend I am describing: an
increase in decisionmaking in an appellate vacuum in circumstances
that cry out for the more contextualized knowledge of trial court
judges.
D. Some Concluding Thoughts on Discretion
In documenting the diminishing discretion of federal district
courts, I have tried to focus on contexts in which that discretion is
least likely to be dangerous or harmful. Nevertheless, discretion al-
ways carries with it the possibility of abuse. The scholarly literature on
the costs and benefits of judicial discretion is extensive, 238 and a gen-
eral discussion of discretion is beyond the scope of this Article. How-
ever, a few points are worth considering.
If we recognize that trial court discretion has both costs and ben-
efits, and that some judges are more likely than others to abuse their
discretion, appellate courts can take either of two approaches in an
attempt to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs. They can
set a baseline (or default) granting district courts broad discretion, or
one granting little discretion. Over time, as individual trial judges de-
velop a reputation for using wisely or poorly whatever discretion they
are given, the appellate court can take that into account when it re-
views the decisions of those judges. So the appellate court might
grant broad discretion, but scrutinize the decisions of particular
judges with more care; or it might grant little discretion, but exercise
little oversight over the decisions of the judges thought to be most
trustworthy.2 3
9
238 In addition to the sources cited in notes 157-163, see, for example, AHARON
BAAK, jUDICIAL DISCRE-rION 152-91 (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989); Stephen B. Bur-
bank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1463, 1476-83 (1987); Roscoe Pound,
The Decadence of Equity, 5 COLUM. L. Ruv. 20, 20-26 (1905); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical
Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. Rrv. 605 (1908);Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form
of Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 GEo. WASH. L. Ruv. 1683,
1809-11 (1992).
239 The increase in the use of unpublished appellate opinions makes both options
easier. See, e.g., Patrick Schiltz, The Citation of Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 23, 26 (2005) (finding 81% of 2004 courts of appeals
decisions on the merits are accompanied by unpublished opinions); David C. Vladek
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Which of these options one favors ultimately depends on one's
view of federal district court judges. They might be mostly trustwor-
thy, attempting to decide cases and follow the rules as best they can,
with only a few potential abusers among them. Or the number of
potential abusers might be large enough to give us pause. The first
view points to a baseline of broad discretion with a careful appellate
eye on the known bad apples; the second to a baseline of narrow dis-
cretion with greater leeway for the judges who have proven themselves
thoughtful and careful. Readers will have to decide for themselves
whether they have enough confidence in the district court bench to
grant them the narrow form of discretion that I advocate.
To this point, my aim in the Article has been largely descriptive. I
have tried to document two simultaneous recent trends: an expan-
sion-with unclear boundaries-of federal-court jurisdiction, and a
diminution of the flexibility and discretion of federal district court
judges. The identification of these trends, which are contrary to con-
ventional wisdom about current federal courts, introduces new com-
plications as yet unaddressed in the literature. First, because the
trends are occurring at the same time, the negative effects of each
trend are multiplied by the other. The coincidence of the two appar-
ently unrelated trends also raises the intriguing possibility that they
stem from a common source (and thus warrant a common remedy).
In the next Part, I present a normative case against the combined con-
sequences of these two doctrinal trends. In the final Part, I turn to
possible causes and cures.
III. FACING THE CONSEQUENCES
The expansion of jurisdiction and the diminution of discretion
each have deleterious consequences when considered independently,
and further negative consequences when considered in combination.
I discuss these consequences in this Part.
First and most obvious, the expansion of federal jurisdiction in-
creases district courts' caseloads. The literature is filled with lamenta-
tion about overcrowded federal court dockets and the delays they
engender, especially in civil cases. 240 The expansion ofjurisdiction-
& Mitu Gulati, Judicial Triage: Reflections on the Debate Over Unpublished Opinions, 62
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1667, 1670 (2005) ("unpublished dispositions now comprise
over 80% of the output of our appellate courts"). The new Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 32.1, which will take effect in December 2006 unless Congress disapproves
it, does not eliminate unpublished opinions but only permits litigants to cite them.
240 See, e.g., RicHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
53-123 (1996); RIcHARi POSNER, THE FEDERAL. COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 59-129
(1985); Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Induced Litigation, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 545,
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whether directly or through the narrowing or elimination of doctrines
that previously allowed trial courts to resolve cases without reaching
the merits-exacerbates the problem. Especially in cases in which the
correct jurisdictional rule is difficult to identify, such as the 5:4 Al-
lapattah interpretation of § 1367, greater sensitivity to trial court reali-
ties might influence the decision at the margins.
The docket-crowding problem, whether derived from incontesta-
ble or doubtful jurisdictional doctrines, is exacerbated by the diminu-
tion in district court discretion. Trial courts faced with overcrowded
dockets have recently lost many of the options that allowed them
some flexibility in resolving cases quickly on an individualized basis, or
in dealing with more global problems affecting their dockets. As I
described in Part I, courts may no longer decide an easy question on
the merits prior to deciding a difficult question of standing, and in
many circuits they can no longer consider efficiency when determin-
ing whether to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. The inevitable du-
plication of effort when a multidistrict litigation case is transferred
back to the original court for trial is another example of inefficiency
at the level of individual cases. On a more global level, the courts'
inability to remove frivolous state lawsuits attacking prior federal judg-
ments means both that more time has to be spent dealing with such
suits and that more such suits are likely to be filed; limitations on the
courts' authority to punish lawyers who make objectively unreasonable
assertions encourages the filing or continuation of unwarranted
claims or defenses.
Docket problems are complicated by a second consequence of
the recent trends, especially prevalent in the Supreme Court's recent
cases on jurisdiction. In many of the cases, the Court's opinions are
opaque, ambiguous, or internally incoherent, leaving the lower courts
with little guidance.
The sovereign immunity cases reflect a lack of transparency in
their failure to reconcile the new cases with existing precedent. As
both the dissenting Justices and scholars have pointed out, there was
545-46 (2004); David Hittmer & Kathleen Weisz Osman, Federal Civil Trial Delays: A
Constitutional Dilemma, 31 S. TEX. L. REv. 341 (1990);Jon 0. Newman, Rethinking Fair-
ness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1643-47 (1985). I recog-
nize that other factors also contribute to the docket problems of federal district
courts, and may indeed have a greater effect than the two trends I identify in this
Article. But the other factors-including the federalization of many crimes, the crea-
tion of new federal civil causes of action, and the increase in the number of state
prisoners (and therefore of potential habeas petitions)-are more intractable. I focus
on the relationship between trial and appellate courts both because it offers a possible
solution, and because it is of inherent interest to scholars studying the federal courts.
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little difference between Kimet241 and Garret 242 on the one hand and
HibbS24 " and Lane2 44 on the other in terms of evidence of a "wide-
spread pattern" of unconstitutional state actions, so lower courts are
left unable to determine whether other federal statutes satisfy the Sec-
tion 5 test.2 45 Similarly, the Katz246 majority points to no persuasive
distinction between the Commerce Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause
that might justify the vast difference in consequences for state sover-
eign immunity,2 47 leaving courts to wonder how to treat other provi-
sions of Article 1.248
The Grabl249 and Allapattah250 cases exhibit other failings with
similar consequences for lower courts. The Grable test for embedded
federal questions is a quintessential open-ended "consider everything"
standard offering neither guidance nor constraints. 251 One situation
that has already divided federal district courts involves the marketing
of unsuccessful tax-avoidance strategies. Plaintiffs in these suits are
purchasers of the tax-avoidance techniques, who were eventually com-
241 Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
242 Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
243 Nev. Dep't. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
244 Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004).
245 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 538-54 (2004) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting); Hibbs, 538
U.S. at 744-59 (KennedyJ., dissenting); Sherry, supra note 78, at 236-50; Nicole E.
Grodner, Note, Disparate Impact Legislation and Abrogation of the States' Sovereign Immu-
nity After Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs and Tennessee v. Lane,
83 TEX. L. Rv. 1173, 1189-93 (2005).
246 Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 126 S. Ct. 990 (2006).
247 See id. at 1007 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to discern an intention to
abrogate state sovereign immunity through the Bankruptcy Clause when no such in-
tention has been found in any of the other clauses in Article 1. Indeed, our cases are
replete with acknowledgements that there is nothing special about the Bankruptcy
Clause in this regard.").
248 For a brief critique of Katz, see Richard A. Epstein, The Federalism Decisions of
Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor: Is Half a Loaf Enough , 58 STAN. L. REv. 1793, 1817-18
(2006). One commentator notes the inconsistency in an understated fashion, sug-
gesting that Justice O'Connor's fifth vote for the majority is "somewhat surprising in
light of her previous votes in state sovereign immunity cases" (she voted with the
majority in Seminole Tribe, Alden, florida Prepaid, College Savings Bank, Kimel, and Gar-
rett, all of which struck down congressional abrogations). Eric Berger, The Collision of
the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 493, 515-16
n.109 (2006).
249 Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005).
250 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
251 Despite my general preference for pragmatic rather than dogmatic judicial
decisionmaking, see DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, DESPERATELY SEEKING CER-
TAINTY: THE MISGUIDED QUEST FOR CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS (2002), jurisdic-
tional rules call for more clarity. See infra text accompanying notes 268-271.
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pelled to pay not only the taxes they sought to avoid but hefty penal-
ties imposed by the IRS. They subsequently sued those involved in
creating and marketing the strategies, alleging common law fraud. In
many of these cases the defendants removed the cases to federal
court, arguing that the fraud claim depended on an underlying ques-
tion of federal tax law. Most federal courts rejected the argument and
remanded to state court, but at least one court accepted it and refused
to remand.2 52 Whatever the correct answer, the division shows that
Grable is not easy to apply. And barely a year after Grable, the Supreme
Court had to resolve another circuit split on jurisdiction over a partic-
ular type of embedded federal question.
253
While the Court's holding in Allapattah is clear, by contrast, its
reasoning has left lower courts struggling with difficult questions.
First, Allapattah relied on the language of § 1367(b) to conclude that
additional plaintiffs joined under Rule 20 were not within the statute's
exclusions from supplemental jurisdiction. 25 4 However, § 1367(b)
specifically prohibits the exercise of jurisdiction (where it would be
inconsistent with the requirements of § 1332) over claims "by plain-
tiffs against persons made parties under Rule . . . 20."2 5 Since Rule
20 authorizes the joinder of defendants as well as plaintiffs, this lan-
guage clearly prohibits one plaintiff from suing multiple defendants
unless she meets the minimum jurisdictional amount for each defen-
dant. But what of a suit by multiple plaintiffs against multiple defend-
ants? What should a district court do if one plaintiff meets all the
jurisdictional requirements for her claims against all the defendants,
but another plaintiff falls short of the minimum amount in her
claims? Had there been but a single defendant, the second plaintiff
could be joined under the rule of Allapattah. Should the mere addi-
tion of a defendant-against whom the original plaintiff states a claim
that satisfies the jurisdictional amount-change the result? The clear
language of § 1367(b), on which the Allapattah majority rests its hold-
ing, mandates the denial of jurisdiction in the multiple-defendant
252 Compare Stechler v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP, No. Civ. A. 05-
3485(HAA), 2006 WL 90916, at *5 (D.N.J. Jan. 13, 2006) (no jurisdiction), Samuel
Trading, LLC v. Diversified Group, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 2d 835, 389-92 (N.D. Ill. 2006)
(same), Snook v. Deutsche Bank AG, 410 F. Supp. 2d 519, 521-24 (S.D. Tex. 2006)
(same) and Sheridan v. New Vista, L.L.C., 406 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792-96 (W.D. Mich.
2005) (same) with Becnel v. KPMG LLP, 387 F. Supp. 2d 984, 985-89 (W.D. Ark.
2005) (jurisdiction).
253 Empire Healthchoice Assurance, Inc. v. McVeigh, 126 S. Ct. 2121, 2136-37
(2006) (distinguishing Grable and finding no federal jurisdiction).
254 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2621.
255 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b) (2000).
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case, a result one lower court has labeled "absurd."256 Other courts
have ignored the issue entirely, assuming jurisdiction in multiple-de-
fendant cases without comment.25
7
Allapattah's second ambiguity has yet to receive any judicial atten-
tion, but it cannot escape notice for long. Given the language of
§ 1367 (b), the holding that additional plaintiffs who lack the requisite
jurisdictional amount can nevertheless join plaintiffs who meet it inev-
itably raises the cognate issue of additional plaintiffs who are not di-
verse from the defendant. The Court addressed this issue directly,
holding that jurisdiction over these nondiverse plaintiffs, unlike juris-
diction over plaintiffs with insufficient claims, is barred by § 1367.258
Here again, the holding itself is clear but the reasoning creates diffi-
culties. The majority distinguished between the two jurisdictional re-
quirements of minimum amount and complete diversity by reasoning
that in the absence of complete diversity, the federal courts lack juris-
diction over the entire case: "In order for a federal court to invoke
supplemental jurisdiction . . .it must first have original jurisdiction
over at least one claim in the action. Incomplete diversity destroys
original jurisdiction with respect to all claims, so there is nothing to
which supplemental jurisdiction can adhere."259
As the dissent pointed out, however, lower courts had often
treated the two core requirements of § 1332 similarly by dismissing
not the entire case but only the diversity-destroying party, a practice
approved by the Supreme Court in Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Lar-
rain.260 The Allapattah majority never mentions Newman-Green, and it
is unclear whether lower courts retain the power to dismiss a diversity-
destroying party but retain the remainder of the case: The language
quoted above strongly suggests that the entire case must be dismissed
256 State Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Yates, 391 F.3d 577, 580 n.15 (5th Cir. 2004) (decided
before Allapattah but relying on 5th Circuit precedent ultimately approved in Allapat-
tah). This problem was noticed in the literature prior to Allapattah, but the Attapattah
Court's reliance on the language of§ 1367 brought it into sharp relief. See, e.g.,John
B. Oakley, Joinder and Jurisdiction in the Federal District Courts: The State of the Union of
Rules and Statutes, 69 TENN. L. REv. 35, 50-56 (2001).
257 See, e.g., Engstrom v. Mayfield, 159 F. App'x. 697, 700-01 (6th Cir. 2005).
258 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2622
259 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2618. For a critique of this "split the baby" approach to
the jurisdictional amount and diversity of citizenship questions, see Adam N. Stein-
man, Sausage-Making, Pigs' Ears, and Congressional Expansions of Federal Jurisdiction: Ex-
xon Mobil v. Allapattah and its Lessons for the Class Action Fairness Act, 81 WASH. L. REv.
279, 313-19 (2006).
260 Allapattah, 125 S. Ct. at 2635 n.5 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Newman-
Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826 (1989)).
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for lack ofjurisdiction. Lower courts, however, have continued to dis-
miss diversity-destroying parties without explanation.
2 61
The Court's opinion in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus-
tries2 6 2 creates similar difficulties for lower courts. Two aspects of the
opinion are particularly problematic. First, the Cpurt described the
reach of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine in two different and somewhat
contradictory ways. In its general description of the doctrine, the
Court twice used the language of Feldman, suggesting that the doc-
trine barred jurisdiction over claims "inextricably intertwined" with
state-courtjudgments. 63 But in summarizing the holding in Saudi Ba-
sic Industries itself-which the Court said was simply a reaffirmation of
Rooker and Feldman-the Court limited the Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
"cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by
state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and rejec-
tion of those judgments."2 64 The difference between the two descrip-
tions is most stark in the context of a typical relitigation case: A
plaintiff who loses in state court brings suit in federal court requesting
relief that is inconsistent with or serves to nullify the state court's judg-
ment. The federal claim is "inextricably intertwined" with the state-
court judgment, but the injury is not "caused by" that judgment.
Lower courts have divided on whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine as
interpreted by Saudi Basic Industries bars this type of federal suit.
26 5
261 See, e.g., Gorfinkle v. U.S. Airways, Inc., 431 F.3d 19, 22 (1st Cir. 2005);
Achtman v. Kirby, McInerney & Squires, LLP, 404 F. Supp. 2d 540, 548 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
262 544 U.S. 280 (2005).
263 See id. at 286 & n.1. The only other appearance of "inextricably intertwined" in
the opinion is at 291, where the Court quotes the court of appeals below.
264 Id. at 284.
265 Compare Indus. Commc'n & Elec., Inc. v, Monroe County, 134 F. App'x 314,
318-19 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding that Rooker-Feldman bars suit because "inextricably
intertwined" with state-court judgment), Williams v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., No. 04-
30768, 2005 WL 776170, at *1-3 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2005) (same), Long v. Wolfe, No.
06CV0633, 2006 WL 1371093, at *3-6 (W.D. Pa. May 18, 2006) (same), and Willhite v.
Collins, 385 F. Supp. 2d 926, 928-29 (D. Minn. 2005) (same), withTurner v. Crawford
Square Apartments II, 449 F.3d 542, 547-48 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding that Rooker-
Feldman does not bar suit because injury caused by defendant, not by state-court judg-
ment), Davani v. Va. Dept. of Transp., 434 F.3d 712, 715-20 (4th Cir. 2006) (same),
Hoblock v. Albany County Bd. of Elections, 422 F.3d 77, 83-93 (2d Cir. 2005) (same),
Fearing v. City of Lake St. Croix Beach, No. Civ. 04-5127, 2006 WL 695548, at *3-6 (D.
Minn. Mar. 17, 2006) (same), and Bracht v. Grushewsky, No. 4:04 CV 1286, 2005 WL
2234578, at *2-5 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 14, 2005) (same). Several of the latter courts have
erased the conflict by finding that "inextricably intertwined" is a "descriptive label
attached to claims that meet the requirements outlined in [Saudi Basic Industries],"
which has "no independent content." Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86-87; accord, McCormick
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A second problem with Saudi Basic Industries lies in the Court's
holding that Rooker-Feldman can only apply if the federal suit is filed
"after the state proceedings [have] ended."266 The Court did not clar-
ify its language, and lower courts are struggling to define the "end" of
state-court proceedings. Since Rooker-Feldman is derived from an inter-
pretation of § 1257, which reserves to the Supreme Court the right to
review state-court judgments, it makes some sense to require a final
judgment from the state's highest court. On the other hand, the pur-
pose of Rooker-Feldman-to prevent state-court litigants from 'jumping
ship" to federal court-suggests that Rooker-Feldman should preclude
federal jurisdiction while state appeals are pending. Lower courts
have, understandably, reached a variety of inconsistent conclusions.267
The lack of clarity in all these jurisdictional cases has a twofold
impact on district courts: Because of the ambiguities, more litigants
are likely to find comfort in the decision and thus to have an arguable
v. Braverman, 451 F.3d 382, 394-95 (6th Cir. 2006); Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441
F.3d 1129, 1142-45 (10th Cir. 2006); Davani, 434 F.3d at 719. One specific question
that arises frequently in this context is whether a claim of constitutional or other
violations in the prosecution of the state suit or the procurement of the state judg-
ment is barred by Rooker-Feldman after Saudi Basic Industries. Compare Johnson v. Ohio
Supreme Court, 156 F. App'x 779, 781-83 (6th Cir. 2005) (barred), Sinclair v. Bank-
ers Trust Co. of Cal., No. 5:05-CV-072, 2005 WL 3434827, at 2-4 (W.D. Mich. 2005)
(same), and Daniels v. Iowa, No. 4:04-CV-40420, 2005 WL 1398498, at *3-9 (S.D. Iowa
May 23, 2005) (same), with McCormick, 451 F.3d at 392-96 (6th Cir. 2006) (not
barred), and Goddard v. Citibank, NA, No. 04CV5317, 2006 WL 842925, at *3-6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2006) (same).
The high number of unpublished Rooker-Feldman opinions (especially among
those finding that the doctrine bars the suit), at both the district and circuit court
levels, is an indication that many lower courts consider Rooker-Feldman indispensable
in resolving unimportant nuisance suits. This suggests that the Court's narrowing of
Rooker-Feldman is likely to have a significant effect on trial court dockets, at least if
lower courts take the narrowing seriously.
266 544 U.S. at 291.
267 See, e.g., Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1031-32 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding
that Rooker-Feldman cannot apply when federal-court suit filed while petition for certi-
orari to state supreme court still pending); Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 89 (unclear whether
interlocutory orders are final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman); Truserv Corp. v.
Flegles, Inc., 419 F.3d 584, 590-91 (7th Cir. 2005) (interlocutory appeals are not final
enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman); Federacifn de Maestros de P.R. v. Junta de Rela-
ciones del Trabajo de P.R., 410 F.3d 17, 24-27 (1st Cir. 2005) (holding that some
interlocutory orders are final enough to trigger Rooker-Feldman); Soad Wattar Living
Trust of 1992 v.Jenner & Block, P.C., No. 04 C 6390, 2005 WL 1651191, at *2-4 (N.D.
I1. July 1, 2005) (finding it unclear whether interlocutory orders are final enough to
trigger Rooker-Feldman); Sinclair v. Bankers Trust Co. of Cal., No. 5:05-CV-072, 2005
WL 3434827, at *2-4 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 13, 2005) (finding that Rooker-Feldman applies
despite filing of federal suit during pendency of state appeal).
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basis for filing in, or removing to, federal court. This further in-
creases the number of cases on the court's docket. And, because the
jurisdictional lines are not clear, the courts themselves must spend
more time grappling with these jurisdictional issues.2 68 Justice
Thomas's concurrence in Grable aptly suggests that "trying to sort out"
some close jurisdictional questions "may not be worth the effort it
entails."
26 9
In addition, the lack of clarity in jurisdictional rules means that
appellate courts, reviewing jurisdictional holdings de novo, have more
opportunities to disagree with lower court holdings. When jurisdic-
tional rules are clear, there is less room for disagreement. But as with
any move from rules to standards-from a formalist to a pragmatist
regime-fuzzy jurisdictional rules give courts greater discretion. In
the jurisdictional context, de novo review at the appellate level both
doubles the number of courts that must struggle with newly difficult
jurisdictional questions and gives the courts of appeals more opportu-
nities to second-guess district court decisions on questions that now
seem to have no single right answer. While I do not want to enter the
extensive debate about whether rules or standards are preferable, 270 it
is worth noting that jurisdictional doctrines are most in need of-and,
until recently, most likely to follow-formal rules.2 7 1 Jurisdiction law
is mostly statutory, and the statutes have not often been significantly
amended. Litigating jurisdictional questions distracts courts from the
268 In the year since Grable, for example, many defendants have removed to fed-
eral court under questionable circumstances, only to have the district court remand
to state court. See, e.g., Samuel Trading, LLC v. The Diversified Group, Inc., 420 F.
Supp. 2d 885, 889-92 (N.D. I1. 2006); Stechler v. Sidley Austin Brown & Wood, LLP,
No. Civ.A. 05-3485, 2006 WL 90916, at *4-8 (D.NJ. Jan. 13, 2006); City of Beatrice v.
Aquila, No. 4:05CV3284, 2006 WL 208831, at *3-8 (D. Neb. Jan. 25, 2006); Glorvigen
v. Cirrus Design Corp., No. 05-2137, 2006 WL 399419, at *2-6 (D. Minn. Feb. 16,
2006); Snook v. Deutsche Bank AG, 410 F.Supp.2d 519, 521-24 (S.D. Tex. 2006);
Sheridan v. New Vista, L.L.C., 406 F. Supp. 2d 789, 792-96 (W.D. Mich. 2005).
269 Grable & Sons Metal Prod. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 125 S. Ct. 2363, 2372 (2005)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
270 For a sampling of the voluminous literature, see, for example, FREDERICK
SCH-AUER, PLAYING By rHE RULES (1991); Larry Alexander, Constitutional Rules, Constitu-
tional Standards, and Constitutional Settlement: Marbury v. Madison and the Case for Judi-
cial Supremacy, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 369, 374-76 (2003); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DuKE LJ. 557 (1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HART. L. REv. 1685, 1702-13 (1976); Kathleen
M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARv. L. REv. 22, 56-118
(1992).
271 See generally Daniel J. Meltzer, Jurisdiction and Discretion Revisited, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1891 (2004) (arguing for clarity and predictability in jurisdictional
rules, and against discretion).
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merits, and has to be done twice because of the rule of de novo re-
view, and thus ought to be made as easy as possible. Finally, the conse-
quences of a "mistaken"jurisdictional ruling are much less substantial
than in other contexts: In most cases, the only issue is whether the
claim on the merits will be litigated in state or federal court. For all
these reasons, formalism has a stronger claim in jurisdictional con-
texts than in most other areas.
More important, the move away from formalism in the jurisdic-
tional context coincides with the move toward formalism-and away
from district court discretion-in the other areas I have discussed.
Both trends have the effect of transferring authority from district
courts to appellate courts. But neither a preference for formalist deci-
sionmaking nor a preference for nonformalist decisionmaking can ex-
plain or justify both trends. If formalism tends to foster efficiency at
the cost of accuracy, and pragmatism does the reverse, the current
regime is the worst of both worlds. As already noted, both the new
jurisdictional rules and some of the diminution in trial-court discre-
tion decrease efficiency in civil litigation.272 But the contraction of
district court discretion (and, to a lesser extent, the lack of clarity of
the jurisdictional rules) also has a negative effect on substance. I close
this Part by suggesting some reasons why district court judges are bet-
ter than appellate court judges at making the very sorts of decisions
that the new jurisprudence increasingly allocates to courts of appeals.
To state it briefly: Trial court judges live in the world of litigation,
and appellate court judges do not. Consider issues ofjudicial federal-
ism, for example. Judicial federalism is a kind of dance, with state and
federal courts responsible for taking the lead in different circum-
stances. Identifying those circumstances is more easily done in situ
than from a remote appellate location. Federal district court judges
and their state-court counterparts are much more likely to interact
and to share solutions to common problems, if only because of geo-
graphical proximity. They deal with the same law firms, are members
of-or speakers to-the same bar associations, read the same local
newspapers, and may often end up shuffling cases back and forth. In
smaller communities, they are probably even in the same social circle.
Many federal district court judges were themselves either members of,
or litigators before, the state-court bench. Think how much more
likely it is that a federal district court judge in Minneapolis than a
court of appeals judge in St. Louis (or pick your own cities) knows
well the Minnesota state-court judge(s) on whom his or her ruling will
have an impact. Obviously, not every federal district court judge will





fit this profile, but in the aggregate, district 
court judges will have a
much more realistic, nuanced, and sensitive 
view of judicial federalism
than will court of appeals judges.
Similarly, their immersion in the world 
of litigation gives trial
court judges a greater appreciation of 
the costs and benefits of partic-
ular allocations of resources, and of 
the strengths and foibles of the
lawyers who practice before them. Appellate 
judges see only briefs
and oral arguments, and are therefore 
removed from the background
facts that provide so much more information 
about the nature of a
case and its participants. Thus a federal 
district court judge who has
seen hundreds of state-law claims is 
in a better position to identify
which ones belong in state court and which 
in federal court. She also
knows how much time and money has 
already been spent on the state-
law claim and can thus better evaluate 
the consequences of a remand
to state court. Even outside the federalism 
context, the district court
judge familiar with litigation generally 
can more easily sort the wheat
from the chaff, and use several of the 
now-defunct practical doctrines
to clear the losers quickly. Experience 
with lawyers and law firms
makes it more likely that she can tell 
when sanctions are needed and
when they are not-and how accusatory 
she needs to be.
Thus, not only are the two trends I have 
identified in this Article
inconsistent with each other and independently 
problematic, together
they have the effect of transferring particular 
types of decisionmaking
authority to those less equipped to exercise 
it well, or, in the case of
some of the jurisdictional doctrines, 
misallocating judicial resources.
Appellate judges are good-perhaps 
better than district court
judges-at making substantive law. 
District court judges are good at
managing litigation. It makes little 
sense, especially in a world of
scarce judicial resources, for appellate 
courts to take over the latter.
IV. CAUSES AND CuREs
In one sense, the two trends I identify 
have no cause: Neither the
Justices on the Supreme Court 
nor the judges on the courts 
of appeals
have affirmatively decided to expand 
jurisdiction or contract discre-
tion. Presumably, the Justices are also 
not being deliberately opaque
or inconsistent.
3 Each individual doctrinal change might 
be the re-
sult of a variety of forces, from views 
on statutory or constitutional
273 There may be some indication 
that the Supreme Court in the future 
will delib-
erately provide even less guidance 
to lower courts by ruling on the narrowest 
ground
possible. See E.J. Dionne, Jr., The Chief 
Justice Sets a Standard, WASH. PosT, 
June 20,
2006, at Al 7 (reporting that Chief 
Justice Roberts, in speech at Georgetown 
Univer-
sity Law School, suggested that the Court 
should decide cases as narrowly as possible).
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interpretation (a move toward textualism, for example) to compro-
mise among the Justices or the judges on a panel.
What all these doctrinal moves have in common, however, is an
insensitivity to the perspective of district courts-a heedlessness of
consequences of the doctrines for the real world of litigation. The
disparate examples of diminishing discretion are united by their un-
willingness to let pragmatic concerns enter into the resolution of legal
questions, even when the "right" answer is far from clear as a matter of
text, history, or precedent. In the cases expanding jurisdiction, the
majority seems more interested in papering over inconsistencies than
in providing guidance to the courts that will have to decipher and
adhere to the decisions. Perhaps all courts, or at least all appellate
courts, view (or should view) their role as making abstract legal deci-
sions insulated from the consequences of those decisions. But I sug-
gest that the problem lies not in a considered decision to ignore
consequences, but rather in simple unfamiliarity with those conse-
quences. Without sufficient exposure to the district court perspective,
appellate courts are simply unaware of the problems that particular
doctrinal choices cause. Were they more aware, it might-at least at
the margins-influence their doctrinal choices.
If I am right about the cause, what is the cure? One possibility is
to somehow increase appellate judges' exposure to the realities of liti-
gation. In the United States, very few appellate judges ever take an
assignment to the district bench, although there are opportunities to
do so. Perhaps we should encourage (or require) court of appeals
judges to sit as trial judges periodically.274 Similarly, although district
court judges already sit by designation on courts of appeals with some
frequency, we might want them to do so more often. One problem
with either of these solutions-more acute when a district court judge
sits on a court of appeals-is that temporary assignments carry with
them confounding difficulties that reduce the effectiveness of the ex-
posure. A districtjudge sitting on a court of appeals is in an awkward
position when it comes to questions of district court authority or dis-
cretion, and a court of appeals judge who conducts an occasional trial
is likely to see only a narrow slice of litigation.
A more promising possibility is to change the make-up of the ap-
pellate bench rather than to educate the judges who are already there.
In other words, we might appoint more district court judges to the
274 Several scholars have made the analogous suggestion that Supreme Court Jus-
tices ought to be required to ride circuit again. See Stephen G. Calabresi & David C.
Presser, Reintroducing Circuit Riding: A Timely Proposal, 90 MINN. L. REv. 1386 (2006);
Suzanna Sherry, Politics andjudgment, 70 Mo. L. Rr,. 973, 986 (2005).
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courts of appeals and the Supreme Court. 
To some degree, this might
already be taking place: Between 1970 
and 2001, the percentage of
court of appeals judges with prior experience 
as federal district judges
increased from 34.4% 
to 44%.275
These numbers do not give much comfort, 
however. Some of the
doctrinal trends I identify in this Article 
began during this period of
rising district court presence on courts 
of appeals, suggesting that
even the current numbers are insufficient 
to achieve the goal of
preventing inattention to the district 
court perspective. Moreover, to
the extent the problem lies with the 
Supreme Court, the increased
appointment of district court judges 
to the courts of appeals does not
help: No former district court judge 
has been appointed to the Su-
preme Court since 1916, and 
none has sat on that Court since 
1930.276
Even at the court of appeals level, many 
cases will be decided without
the participation of a former district court 
judge. Because the circuits
differ in both the total number of judges 
and the number of judges
with district court experience, the likelihood 
of having a three-judge
panel without any former district court 
judges varies: In 2001, the re-
cent high point of district court representation, 
it ranged from 0% in
the First Circuit to 70% in the Tenth 
Circuit, with median of just over
15%.277
275 As 1 describe later, this trend may 
be reversing. See infra note 278 and 
accom-
panying text.
These figures, as well as all other data 
in this Part, are compiled from the 
Bio-
graphical Directory of Federal Judges 
prepared by the Federal Judicial Center 
[here-
inafter Biographical Directory of Federal 
Judges], available at http://www.fjc.gov/
public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited August 
3, 2006).
Data was collected on all court of appeals 
judges sitting between January 1, 1970
and August 1, 2006. Senior judges were 
excluded from all calculations. For 
all calcu-
lations, N is the total number of judges in 
the circuit in the relevant year (or years),
and E is the number of judges in the 
circuit with prior district court experience. 
The
percentage of judges with district court 
experience, for Figures 1 and 3 and 
state-
ments in the text, is E/N. The probability 
of randomly selecting a three-judge panel
without a former district court judge, 




276 John H. Clarke was appointed 
to the Court in 1916 and retired in 
1922. Ed-
ward T. Sanford was appointed in 1923 
and sat until he died in 1930. Clarke 
was a
district judge from 1914 to 1916 and Sanford 
from 1908 to 1923. Biographical Direc-
tory of Federal Judges, supra note 275.
277 The First Circuit is the only circuit 
with a large enough number of former
district court judges-at least four out 
of six since 1984, and three out of five 
for the
four preceding years-to ensure that 
every panel has at least one; between 
1992 and
2001, five of the six First Circuitjudges 
had district court experience, making 
it likely
that many panels consisted entirely 
of former district court judges. The 
First Circuit
has the best record on the issues I survey: 
It is the only circuit to have rejected 
the
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Finally, more recent appointments suggest a reversal of the 1970-
2001 trend:
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Second Circuit's reduction of district court discretion in the Rule 11 context. See
supra note 228. It was also one of the four circuits that read § 1367(b) narrowly,
finding no supplemental jurisdiction over claims by plaintiffs who did not meet the
jurisdictional minimum. The others were the Third, with a below-median probability
of producing panels without district court experience, the Eighth, just above the me-
dian, and the Tenth, which had the highest probability of producing such panels. See
supra note 110; infra Figure 2. No data are perfect.
278 All data are current as of August 1, 2006. This drop is especially unexpected
given that there has been a Republican administration for the past six years. Presi-
dents usually draw judicial appointments from their own party. See, e.g., SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES 357 (1997); DONALD R. SONGER ET AL., CONTINUIT-
AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 32 (2000); Robert A. Carp et
al., Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of
Appeals, 50 Am. J. POL. Sci. 478, 485 (2006). A Republican following two or more
terms of Democratic presidents, or a Democratic following two or more terms of Re-
publican presidents, will therefore likely have fewer district court judges to draw
from-the most recently appointed judges from his party when he takes office will
have been appointed at least eight years before. Some will have retired, and others
might be considered too old. As a president's term progresses, however, and espe-
cially into his second term, he will be able to draw from his own district court appoin-
tees. Thus, for the period between 1980 and 1992 (three terms of Republican
presidents), the percentage of former district court judges on the courts of appeals
increased from 39.2% to 40.9%. For Democrat Bill Clinton's two terms, it increased
from 40.9% to 43%. While these increases are small, they are in stark contrast to the
sharp decrease for the current administration's term and a half.
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Thus we see that in 2006, the likelihood of a three-judge panel with-
out a former district court judge ranges from 0% in the First Circuit to
100% in the Tenth, with a median of almost 24%. Similarly, between
2001 and 2006 the probability of a panel lacking any district court
experience rose in all but three circuits:
FIGURE 2. PROBABILITY OF PANEL WITHOUT A
FORMER DIsTRicT COURT JUDGE
If we focus on new appointees only (as opposed to the combined
district court experience of all sitting court of appeals judges), the
recent drop is even more dramatic:
It 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th loth 11th Dc
Circtutit Circwh Ckcttt trcttt Citctttt Ctrutt Circmit Ctratit Cirtuit Circtttit Circttit Circtttit
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(1989-90) (1991-92) (1993-94) (1995-96) (1997-99)(1909-2000)(2001-02) (2009-04) (2005-06)
Appointing Congress
While we do not know whether this newer trend will continue, it
is intriguing. If 2008 sees the election of a Democratic president, the
number of appointments from the district court bench is likely to re-
main low for at least a few years: There will have been no Democratic
district court judges appointed for eight years, limiting the number of
district court judges in the likely pool of candidates. 279 And if the
current trend is a deliberate choice by President Bush and his advis-
ers, a subsequent Republican president might also choose to follow it.
However, whether the number of district court judges serving on
courts of appeals continues to drop, levels off, or even increases slowly
as it did between 1970 and 2001, we should not expect much change
in the doctrinal trends. If the problem is indeed the lack of district
court experience, only a much more dramatic increase in the number
of district court judges elevated to the appellate bench has any chance
of making a difference. And that is where some scholars start wring-
ing their hands, complaining that putting too many district court
judges on the courts of appeals risks two dangers: The professionaliza-
tion of the judiciary-so that it becomes "technocratic, bureaucratic,




[and] bloodless"280-and the influence that hope of promotion might
exert on district judges' decisions.2 81 Maybe so, but I hope this Arti-
cle has suggested the risks of the converse: Appellate judges with too
little trial-court experience are likely to make federal litigation more
complex, time-consuming, and difficult than it needs to be. Before we
decide how to make the trade-off between professionalization and ex-
pertise by reducing the number of district judges who serve on appel-
late courts, we ought to consider what a lack of expertise at the
appellate level might do to litigation on the ground. 282
CONCLUSION
This Article has both a descriptive and a prescriptive focus. It
identifies two significant doctrinal trends that have not been previ-
ously noticed and are in fact contrary to conventional wisdom. More
important, I take three normative positions in the Article: First, the
Supreme Court's recent expansion ofjurisdiction has paid insufficient
attention to transparency, clarity, or consequences for district courts.
Second, district court judges do not have enough discretion over pro-
cedural decisions that help them manage cases, litigants, lawyers, and
the complexities of judicial federalism. And third, to prevent further
280 GOLDMAN, supra note 278, at 364; accord Bollinger, The Mind in the Major Ameri-
can Law School, 91 Micn. L. REv. 2167, 2176 (1993); Guido Calabresi, The Current,
Subtle--and Not So Subtle-Rejection of an IndependentJudiciary, 4 U. PA. J. CONsr. L. 637,
643-44 (2002); William H. Rehnquist, 2001 Year-End Report on the Federal Judiciary (Jan.
1, 2002), www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001year-endreport.html;
Lee C. see also Lee Epstein et al., The Norm of Prior Judicial Experience and Its Conse-
quences for Career Diversity on the U.S. Supreme Court, 91 CAL. L. REv. 903, 941 (2003)
(criticizing the norm of prior judicial experience for Supreme Court Justices).
281 See Carp et al., supra note 278, at 490; Mark A. Cohen, ExplainingJudicial Behav-
ior or What's "Unconstitutional" about the Sentencing Commission?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
183, 188-89 (1991); Tracey E. George, Judicial Independence and the Ambiguity of Article
IIIProtections, 64 OHIO Sr. L.J. 221, 226-41 (2003); Daniel Klerman, Nonpromotion and
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REv. 455 (1999); Kevin M. Scott, Understanding Judi-
cial Hierarchy: Reversals and the Behavior of Intermediate Appellate Judges, 40 LAW & Soc'v
REv. 163, 170 n.5 (2006); see also GOLDMAN, supra note 278, at 305-06 (describing the
Reagan administration's detailed focus on the opinions of a district court judge being
considered for nomination to the court of appeals).
282 This Article is meant as a first attempt to identify the problem and suggest
solutions. Further empirical research is warranted regarding both the causes and
cures. We might want to look more closely at the differences between the Supreme
Court and the courts of appeals; to look beyond district court experience to other
types of litigation experience (including both state-court judicial experience and ex-
perience as a litigator); and to compare doctrinal developments in specific circuits
with the representation of district court judges on the appellate bench, whether by
appointment or by designation.
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developments with a detrimental effect on district court functioning,
we should appoint more federal district court judges to the federal
courts of appeals (as well as to the Supreme Court). All three norma-
tive positions are out of favor among scholars-the first primarily be-
cause the great acclaim for the substantive jurisdictional rulings
themselves keeps scholars from examining their foundations too
closely, the second as a part of the larger movement in favor of popu-
lar sovereignty and governmental accountability, and the third out of
concern for secondary consequences. In other words, my normative
conclusions, like my doctrinal descriptions, are contrary to current
conventional wisdom. I hope that debunking the doctrinal aspects
has raised questions on the normative side as well.
